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EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE
LENGTH OF A CRIMINAL SENTENCE:




Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr.***
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant A was convicted twice previously of felonies and sen-
tenced to prison for fraudulent use of a credit card ($80.00) and for
passing a forged check ($28.36). Upon his third felony conviction for
obtaining money by false pretenses ($120.75), he received a mandatory
life sentence under a state recidivist statute.
Defendant B was convicted six times previously of felonies, in-
cluding three convictions for third-degree burglary, once obtaining
money under false pretenses, one grand larceny (more than $50.00),
and a third-offense driving while intoxicated. Upon his seventh felony
conviction for uttering a "no account" check ($100), he received a
mandatory life sentence under a state recidivist statute.
Suppose the defendant in each hypothetical above challenges the recidi-
vist sentence as being disproportionate and unconstitutional under the incor-
porated eighth amendment.1 In classic law school parlance, "How do you
* A land of Settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom slowly broadens down
From precedent to precedent ...
A. TENNYSON, You Asked Me, Why, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF ALFRED LoRD TENNYsoN 69
(1885).
** Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.S. Florida State University
1974; J.D. Holland Law Center, University of Florida 1977. Admitted, Florida.
*** Professor of Law, Holland Law Center, University of Florida. A.B., 1958, J.D., 1961, Uni-
versity of Georgia; L.L.M., University of Illinois 1962; L.L.M., Yale University 1968. Admitted,
Georgia.
1. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The "cruel and unusual punishments" clause
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rule and why?" If you conclude that the first sentence is constitutional and
the second sentence is unconstitutional, then you know the distinct holdings
in Rummel v. Estelle2 and Solem v. Helm.3 If you are able to reconcile these
holdings, your analytical abilities may exceed those of the Justices who voted
these holdings into precedent.
Our emphases here are at once narrow and broad. First, our narrow
concern is only one aspect of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause-
the doctrine of proportionality as it applies to the length of a prison sentence
for a term of years. Thus, beyond the scope of this article are such related
issues as non-constitutional limits on the length of a sentence,4 the constitu-
tionality of the type of punishment imposed,5 the constitutionality of the
death penalty,6 and the constitutionality of defining particular conduct as
criminal.7 Simply stated, the proportionality doctrine prohibits a punish-
ment more severe than that deserved by the criminal for the harm caused
and the moral blameworthiness exhibited.8 The Supreme Court has held
that the incorporated eighth amendment forbids grossly disproportionate
sentencing, but has been cautious in applying the principle. With this, as
with many other constitutional principles, the Court has had an uneven ex-
perience in developing a methodology for decision. Its recent efforts are the
subject of our paper.
Decisions like Rummel and Helm belie much constitutional simplicity.
Hence, our inquiry must broaden to approach understanding. A back-
ground history emphasizing the last three Supreme Court decisions on pro-
portionality begins our inquiry. Next, reconciliation and stare decisis are
examined in a search for some unifying theme. Finally, going beyond hold-
ings, we posit a new synthesis for understanding and explaining the propor-
tionality case law. Along the way, fundamental principles of
has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
2. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 53-76.
3. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 95-117.
4. The great majority of appeals against the length of an imposed sentence do not reach the
constitutional threshold and merely amount to a request for an appellate review of the trial court's
discretion. Such an authority in appellate courts, to reduce sentences within the statutory limits, is
itself a creature of statute. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958). See generally Hopkins,
Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A Method of Swift Appellate Action, 23 UCLA L. REv. 491 (1976);
Labbe, Appellate Review of Sentences: Penology on the Judicial Doorstep, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 122 (1977); Note, Disparity and Discretion in Sentencing: A Proposal for Uniformity, 25
UCLA L. REv. 323 (1977).
5. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
6. See, eg., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957).
8. At times, proportionality doctrine is confused with what has been called the "necessity
principle." The latter, which only indirectly applies to our topic, holds that "even if punishment is
deserved, it is unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals
of punishment." Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1119,
1123-24 (1979). See infra text accompanying notes 253-54. See also Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth,
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 665-68 (1983) (distinguishing disproportionate sentences from sentences
which are "comparatively excessive" when compared to lesser sentences imposed in factually com-
parable cases).
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constitutionalism, federalism, separated powers, and judicial review neces-
sarily must be explored.
II. PROPORTIONALITY CASE LAW
A. Background
We resist the scholarly temptation to trace the concept of proportional-
ity back to the Rosetta stone. It should be noted, however, that the philo-
sophical roots of the proportionality doctrine run deep in the principle of
personhood in Western thought. The proportionality principle is but an-
other example of the leitmotiff in modem constitutional law that government
is obliged to respect the human dignity of its citizens. 9 Historically, the
story of the eighth amendment has been told in secondary literature1 ° and in
case reports." A brief background of the proportionality requirement
within the law of the eighth amendment will serve as base relief for our
contemplation of the recent triology.
Searches for the proverbial framers' intent have met with mixed results.
The requirement that the punishment be proportionate to the crime may be
traced backward to the Magna Charta in 1215 and forward through the
English common law, the English Bill of Rights in 1689, and beyond. 12 The
issue of the framers' intent is a paradigm in the interpretivism versus non-
interpretivism debate in the recent constitutional literature.' 3 Traditionally,
the framers were thought to have been concerned only with torturous and
inhumane punishment methods.' 4 The prevailing view today, however, is
9. It is essentially an Enlightenment concept. Note, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and
the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment
Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 783 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Eighth Amendment, Bec-
caria, and the Enlightenment]. For an extended discussion of the philosophical context, see generally
Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportional-
ity and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063, 1073-81 (1981); Note, supra note 8, at
1121-24. One difficulty in relying on philosophical arguments in such matters is that the extant
philosophies of punishment cannot be harmonized. See generally Galligan, Guidelines and Just
Deserts: A Critique of Recent Trends in Sentencing Reform, 1981 CRiM. L. REV. 297; Lopez, The
Crime of Criminal Sentencing Based on Rehabilitation, 11 GOLDEN GATE 533 (1981); Schwartz,
Options in Constructing A Sentencing System Sentencing Guidelines Under Legislative or Judicial
Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637 (1981).
10. See generally L. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1975);
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L.
REv. 839 (1969); Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 639 (1979); Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling
Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980).
11. See, eg., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Id. at 316-22 (Marshall, J., concurring); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 425-27 (2d Cir.
1978) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979).
12. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3006-07 (1983). The English experience is chronicled,
without agreement, in the following: Mulligan, supra note 10, at 640-42; Schwartz, supra note 10, at
378-81; Note, "Down the Road Toward Human Decency . Eighth Amendment Proportionality Anal-
ysis and Solem v. Helm, 18 GA. L. REv. 109, 111-14 (1983).
13. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 13-14, 97, 173-76 (1980). We choose
not to enter that larger fray here, except to a limited extent in identifying our ratchet theory. See
infra text accompanying notes 219-72.
14. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3021 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); See I. BRANT, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 155 (1965); Granucci, supra note 10, at 842; Note, What is
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 24 HARV. L. REv. 54, 55 (1910-11).
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that the framers intended to create a constitutional "right to be free from
excessive punishments."1 Is The seeming lack of attention by the framers
16
has been more than made up by the Supreme Court in the last few Terms,
but earlier judicial treatment must be described as sporadic and tentative.
In Supreme Court precedent, the proportionality doctrine may be
traced back to Justice Field's 1892 dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont.17
The defendant, a legitimate New York dealer, was convicted of 307 separate
counts of mail-order sales of liquor in Vermont, a dry state. His cumulative
fine plus costs were $6,638.72 and he was committed until payment; a failure
to meet a payment deadline would result in a 19,914 day (about 55 years)
sentence at hard labor. A majority dismissed the writ for want of jurisdic-
tion because the error had not been preserved 18 and because the eighth
amendment did not then apply to the states.19 Justice Field, along with Jus-
tices Harlan and Brewer, dissented on both holdings and concluded that the
eighth amendment was violated by such "punishments which by their exces-
sive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charge."'20
15. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3007. See generally Granucci, supra note 10; Wheeler, Toward
a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838
(1972); Note, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment, supra note 9; Note, Revival
of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16
STAN. L. REv. 996 (1964).
16. The debate in Congress was both brief and unilluminating:
Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words, "nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments," the import of them being too indefinite. Mr. Livermore.-The clause seems to
express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems
to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive
bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the
court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes
necessary to hand a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut
off, but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission
of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we
have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.
The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a considerable majority.
I ANNALS OF THE CONG. 754 (. Gales, ed. 1789) (complete debate).
17. 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). Cf Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
There are several explanations for the first century of desuetude, and, perhaps, some of them explain
the small number of decisions. Chief among them was the developmental stage of penology then. It
was not until the middle of the 19th century that the states began even to establish and to organize
the penitentiary system. See D. ROT-MAN, THE DISCOvERY OF THE ASYLUM, 79-81 (1971). For
most of our nation's early history, imprisonment was used only for holding the accused for trial and
was not used as a method of punishment. See G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTivEs xi (1958). The
Supreme Court has itself noted another factor, the century long omission of Congressional authori-
zation to hear criminal appeals: "It was not until 1889 that Congress permitted criminal defendants
to seek a writ of error in this Court, and then only in capital cases. . . . Only then did it become
necessary for this Court to deal with issues presented by the challenge of verdicts on appeal."
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 88 (1978) (citation and footnote omitted). See also infra note 38.
18. 144 U.S. at 331.
19. Id. at 332. See also Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866). The second
holding would not be available today. See supra note 2. The cumulative punishments would be
proper under modem principles of double jeopardy law, if otherwise consistent with legislative in-
tent. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 392 (1932). A $20 fine for each count seems beyond
challenge and proportionate. Three days for each $1 might be more problematical today. Cf Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (indigent convicted of offenses punishable by fine only cannot be incarcer-
ated a sufficient time to satisfy fines). But cf O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. at 326 (second offense
punishable by one month imprisonment).
20. 144 U.S. at 339-40, 370-71, Justice Field considered punishments of other offenses in the
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The first majority position embracing the proportionality principle
came in 1910 in Weems v. United States.2 1 The defendant was convicted of
falsifying a public document and was sentenced to fifteen years of cadena
temporal ("temporary chain"), a punishment remnant of the Spanish Civil
Code that included imprisonment, hard and painful labor, shackling at the
ankle and wrist, and the permanent loss of basic civil rights.22 The Court's
analysis began with a candid admission that neither legislative history nor
stare decisis nor commentary shed much light on the central meaning of the
amendment. The majority declared "it is a precept of justice that punish-
ment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense."' 23 Jus-
tice McKenna, writing for the majority, was not content to rest this holding
only on the malleable concept of the framers' intent but invoked the ac-
cepted principle that the Constitution must be read in light of contemporary
social needs as well. In majestic language of role, the Court committed to a
course of broad interpretation of the eighth amendment 24 based on objective
measures going beyond general sensibilities 25 to include comparisons with
punishments of similar crimes in other jurisdictions26 and comparisons with
punishments for more serious crimes within the same jurisdiction.2 7 No-
where in the opinion did the Court qualify this bold statement of principle.
Applying this comparative law analysis, the Court held that the defendant's
sentence was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompa-
nies and follows imprisonment. . . [and] unusual in its character. Its pun-
jurisdiction, the sense of "any man of right feeling and heart," and the "civilized and Christian
community of the country." Id. at 340. His argument linked the fifth and eighth amendments. See
Note, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment, supra note 9, at 795 n.3.
21. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights., PHIL. CONST. ART. III § 1(19). The clause came verbatim from the
eighth amendment and Congress intended the same meaning. 217 U.S. at 367. Thus the analysis
was the same as under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at
3009.
22. 217 U.S. at 364-65. Lost civil rights included parental authority, marital authority, prop-
erty ownership, capacity for public office, and irrevocable disenfranchisement; permanent and com-
plete surveillance for life were imposed, as well. Id.
23. Id. at 367.
24. Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience
of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions
and purposes, Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly human institutions
can approach it." The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad tenden-
cies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule
a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and
power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality. And this
has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against
narrow and restrictive construction.
Id. at 373. See also id. at 385-86 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 375.
26. Id. at 380.
27. Id. at 380-81. Only six justices participated in the decision. Justice White, joined by Justice
Holmes, dissented at length and disagreed with all of the majority's analysis. Id. at 382-413.
(White, J., dissenting).
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ishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on
account of their degree and kind."' 28 Thus, the decision may be viewed as a
basic constitutional law holding that the power of the legislature to define
crimes and punishments is prominent, but not absolute, and that the engine
of judicial review creates an affirmative role for the Court.2 9 While the
"function of the legislature is primary," constitutional limits exist, "and
what those are the judiciary must judge."'30 Equally important, the Court
admitted an evolutionary potential for humanity in the amendment, 31 a
landmark holding in eighth amendment law.32 The Court thus recognized
the most serious issue at stake was whether the judiciary could review the
legislative exercise and declare that the statutory sentencing parameters vio-
lated the constitutional guarantee. Its answer was an unequivocal assertion
of the power and, indeed, an acknowledgement of the constitutional duty to
perform the review function. Equally critical was the Court's assertion that
the duty was on-going under an evolving principle. The proportionality re-
quirement was to be flexible and dynamic and not controlled by the dead
hand of past senses of decency; "a principle to be vital must be capable of a
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."33 While the Court
owed legislative enactments great deference, the Constitution obliged a dy-
namic judicial review.
These two eighth amendment principles laid dormant for nearly fifty
years. During that period, the proportionality principle figures in sentences
in two Supreme Court decisions. In the first, the Court upheld a state recidi-
vism statute which imposed a mandatory life sentence on a thrice-convicted
felon. 34 The cryptic one sentence in the unanimous opinion rejecting the
eighth amendment claim must be attributed to the refusal, as of 1912, to
incorporate that guarantee into fourteenth amendment due process.35 The
second decision involved a federal sentence of five years concurrent and
$7,000 cumulative fine for seven counts of mail fraud.36 Best understood,
the one line rejection of the eighth amendment claim simply suggests that
the Court did not find that sentence cruel and unusual. 37
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id. at 367, 378-79. That the Weems opinion was meant to be as broad as the eighth amend-
ment seems obvious and a close reading of the Court's handiwork supports the conclusion. See
Dressier, supra note 9, at 1090-91.
30. 217 U.S. at 379.
31. "The clause. . . may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 378.
32. "Most scholars commenting on the case at the time appeared surprised, if not somewhat
shocked, by the decision." L. BERKSON, supra note 10, at 67. See Friedman, Comment on Recent
Judicial Decisions-Cruel and Unusual Punishment, I J. CRIM. L. 612 (1910); Schofield, Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 5 Nw. U.L. REV. 321 (1911). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
33. "Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a prin-
ciple to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." 217
U.S. at 373.
34. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). See Dressier, supra note 9, at 1093-94.
35. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. at 631 (citing inter alia Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas,
212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) and In re Kemmler 136 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1890)). See also Collins v. John.
son, 237 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1915).
36. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916). See Dressier, supra note 9, at 1092-93.
37. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 291 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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In 1958, the evolutionary theme gained prominence again38 in Trop v.
Dulles.39 The plurality held that the eighth amendment prohibited denation-
alization for a soldier's crime of being absent without leave one day.4°
Marking the modem era of the proportionality principle, Chief Justice War-
ren captured the essence of the Weems reading of the eighth amendment:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish,
the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execu-
tion may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but
any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is con-
stitutionally suspect. This Court has had little occasion to give precise
content to the Eighth Amendment, and, in an enlightened democracy
such as ours, this is not surprising. But when the Court was con-
fronted with a punishment of 12 years in irons at hard and painful
labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public records, it did not hesi-
tate to declare that the penalty was cruel in its excessiveness and unu-
sual in its character. [citing Weems] The Court recognized in that case
that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope
is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.41
Four years later, a majority applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence. The defendant in Robinson v. California42 was given a ninety-
day sentence for the being addicted to the use of narcotics. Recognizing that
38. Some explanations may be offered for the fifty year hiatus between Weems and its modem
progeny. See Note, supra note 12, at 117-18 n.32. See also supra note 17. First, before incorpora-
tion into the fourteenth amendment, there were fewer opportunities for applying eighth amendment
principles. See supra note 1. One might observe that only state sentences have been voided under
the proportionality principle, suggesting that federal judges are more reluctant to reverse their own
trial judges. Note, supra note 12, at 117 n.32. Concerns for federalism, however, push the other
way. A better explanation is that state sentencing statutes have been much more draconian than
their federal counterparts. Second, the Weems decision itself was treated inhospitably by lower
federal courts which seemed to confuse the constitutional issue with the non-constitutional question
of appellate review of sentences. See supra note 4. Kg., Edwards v. United States, 206 F.2d 855
(10th Cir. 1953); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952); United States v. Corcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945), cert denied, 327 U.S. 794 (1946);
Kachnic v. United States, 53 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1931); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir.
1930); Bailey v. United States, 284 F. 126 (7th Cir. 1922). But see Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687
(D. Nev. 1918). Two reasons suggest themselves for this lack of enthusiasm. Justice White's power-
ful dissent and the careful ambiguities of the majority opinion taken together may have warned-off
lower court judges. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 385-86. See also Singer, Sending Men to Prison:
Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative As
Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. RaV. 51, 67 (1972); Turkington, Unconstitu-
tionally Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle,
3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 145, 149-50 (1967). Additionally, it should be noted that there were no fewer than
nineteen decisions between 1910 and 1975 which declared sentences unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate. L. BERKSON, supra note 10, at 191-92 n.46 (citations).
39. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
40. Chief Justice Warren authored an opinion joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Wittaker.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan also con-
curred, but separately. Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Burton, Clark, and Harlan.
41. Id. at 100-01 (note omitted). See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment: Judicial Self-
Restraint and Legislative Power, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 434, 442-43 (1982).
42. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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such a punishment considered in the abstract was neither cruel nor unusual,
the Court appealed to "contemporary human knowledge" to declare that
any imprisonment would be disproportionate to the offense of addiction,
placing that status beyond the legislative criminalization power.43 Justice
Stewart's opinion emphasized the limited role of the Supreme Court to de-
fine "the range of valid choice" without considering "the wisdom of any
particular choice within the allowable spectrum." 44 The legislature, how-
ever, had gone beyond the constitutional limit.4 5
More recently, proportionality analysis has played a prominent role in
the Court's many death-penalty cases, which are beyond the scope of our
treatment here except in a most general way.46 The mere existence of a
death penalty "is not a license to Government to devise any punishment
short of death within the limits of its imagination."' 47 The twin themes of
human dignity and judicial role weave throughout this line of cases. 48 The
Court has applied the proportionality principle to hold capital punishment
excessive for felony murder when the defendant did not intend to, attempt
to, or actually take a life, 49 and for the crime of unaggravated rape of an
adult woman. 50 These decisions and otherss circumscribe the constitu-
tional role of the federal judiciary in proportionality reviews. Concerns for
federalism and separation of powers caution judicial activism. Objective in-
dicia of contemporary standards of decency mark the progress of our soci-
ety. Historical developments, legislative judgments, sentencing patterns of
juries, and even international opinion all inform the judicial decision. Ulti-
mately, the Court's basic concept of contemporary human decency must
control. Judging remains inescapable.52
Within the foregoing precedent stream, the Supreme Court decided
.three cases which must be highlighted to achieve an appreciation for the
43. IdM at 666-68.
44. Id. at 665.
45. Arguably, a narrower interpretation of Robinson is that an illness, like addiction, may not
be criminalized regardless of the proportionality of the punishment. See Gardner, The Determinate
Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel
v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.. 1103, 1115; Mulligan, supra note 10, at 644; Comment, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964). Best understood, the holding was that
any punishment was disproportionate to the crime of addiction. See Radin, The Jurisprudence of
Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989,
994 (1978). Such is the current understanding of the Court. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3008.
46. See supra note 6.
47. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 99 (dictum).
48. See, e-g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-76 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
271-79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
50. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
51. The standards-of-decency approach is firmly entrenched in our constitutional theory. See,
eg., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 172-76; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288-90 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 330-32 (Marshall, ., concurring); Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S.
889 (1963). The Court has recognized the legitimacy of the proportionality principle in other deci-
sions without relying on it directly. E.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 n.3 (1982); Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977). But cf Pulley v.
Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984) (the Constitution does not require that a state appellate court compare
a death sentence with the penalties imposed in similar cases, if requested to do so by the defendant).
See generally Gardner, supra note 45, at 1116-19.
52. See Mulligan, supra note 10, at 645.
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current proportionality principle. Beyond the case sequence we will attempt
a reconciliation and propose a new synthesis.
B. Rummel v. Estelle
Rummel v. Estelle,5 3 of course, is the "Defendant A" hypothetical.
William James Rummel was convicted in 1964 of fraudulent use of a credit
card to obtain $80 worth of goods; he was convicted in 1969 of passing a
forged check for $28.36; finally, in 1973 he was convicted of obtaining
money ($120.75) by false pretenses. All three nonviolent property offenses
were classified as felonies under Texas law. The state prosecutor elected to
prosecute Rummel for his third or "trigger" offense under the Texas recidi-
vist statute.5 4 Under the statute, which provided for a mandatory life sen-
tence upon a conviction for a third felony following conviction and
imprisonment for two prior felonies, the state trial judge imposed the obliga-
tory life sentence. After unsuccessful state direct appeals and collateral at-
tacks, Rummel moved through the federal procedures for collateral review
and appeal, culminating in an affirmance of the denial of federal relief by a
five-to-four Supreme Court division. 55
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality,56 began with two "givens":
the Texas recidivist statute was constitutional on its face 57 and each of the
three underlying offenses was constitutionally punishable as a felony.58
Thus narrowed, the constitutional question was whether the state could im-
pose a sentence of life imprisonment for these three sequential felonies.5 9
The plurality's opinion must be described as somewhat disingenuous. Con-
ceding that the Court had "on occasion stated" a principle of proportional-
ity, the plurality stressed that recent applications had been limited to the
53. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). The Rummel decision generated a lot of secondary interest. See eg.,
8 AM. . CRiM. L. 209 (1980); 19 DUQ. L. REv. 167 (1980); 26 LOY. L. REv. 698 (1980); 46 Mo. L.
REv. 652 (1981); 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305 (1979); 12 ST. MARY'S LJ. 525 (1980); 49 U. CIN. L.
REv. 725 (1980); 15 VALP. U.L. REv. 201 (1980); 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 546 (1981).
54. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (1925), recodified as tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974). The
Court did not expressly consider Rummel's complete record. He had been convicted of at least
twelve separate crimes between 1959 and 1973, some of which were rather serious as, for example,
carrying a deadly weapon, burglary, and aggravated assault. We cannot be sure that the Court
viewed his criminal career as more serious than the formal recidivist record disclosed, but we can be
sure that the Court was made aware of it. Brief for Amicus Curiae, District Attorney of Bexar
County, Texas, at 3, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
55. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Rummel's conviction. Rummell v. State,
509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). He then filed an unsuccessful petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas claiming, inter alia, that
his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. A divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of relief. Rummel v. Estelle, 568
F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). On rehearing, the en banc court rejected the panel's ruling and affirmed
the district court's denial of the petition. 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), affd, 445 U.S. 263
(1980).
56. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and
Blackmun. Justice Stewart concurred separately. See infra note 57.
57. The Court had held as much in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). This alone seemed
to justify Justice Stewart's enigmatic concurrence in Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Curiously, in this regard, Rummel may be considered a 4:1:4 decision on the issue on certio-
rari and an 8:1 decision on the issue that Spencer controlled-only Justice Stewart thought so.
58. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See also supra note 45.
59. The majority was careful to note that a large number of states authorized significant terms
of imprisonment for each of Rummel's three individual crimes. 445 U.S. at 269-71 nn.9-10.
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death penalty. Because the death penalty is unique in its finality and abso-
luteness, the plurality sought to distinguish those recent proportionality
precedents as different in kind. The very rarity of successful proportionality
challenges was suggested as somehow lessening the principle which thereby
was conceded some viability.60 Still, the plurality had to contend with
Weems v. United States.61 Weems was limited to "its peculiar facts," includ-
ing the minor nature of the offense, the lengthy minimum term, and the
extraordinary accessory punishments of the cadena temporal. Thus, under-
stating precedent, the plurality overstated its revisionist position:
[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies,
that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state
penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a
matter of legislative prerogative.62
Eschewing a subjective judicial role, the plurality's procrustean use of prece-
dent drew a "bright line" between the ultimate sanction and all lesser terms
of imprisonment. Importantly, the plurality conceded a limited judicial role
based on sufficiently objective factors. It rejected as lacking true objectivity,
however, such criteria as the absence of violence or the relatively small sums
of money at stake. Instead, the Court emphasized the state's heightened
interest in dealing with recidivists, those offenders who have demonstrated
an unwillingness to conform to societal norms. The plurality found the de-
tailed and complex comparisons of the various states' recidivism schemes
unconvincing and too sophisticated a calculus, given such vagaries as parole
policies and prosecutorial discretion.63 Further, the Court was not per-
suaded by a comparative analysis to other punishments for crimes in
Texas.64
Justice Powell's dissent merits attention for how it answered the plural-
ity and for the lasting significance of its proffered analysis.65 The dissent's
starting premise, based on legislative history, framers' intent, and decisional
law, was that the disproportionality analysis is an inherent aspect of the
60. See Gardner, supra note 45, at 1124 n.155, 1125.
61. 217 U.S. 349 (1910), discussed at Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272-77. See also supra text accom-
panying notes 21-33.
62. 445 U.S. at 274. The majority added a crucial note: "This is not to say that a proportional-
ity principle would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, .. if a
legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." Id. at n.l 1.
63. 445 U.S. at 277-84.
64. Id. at 282-83 n.27. Texas does have something of a vengeful sentencing attitude. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. State, 509 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (1,500 years for robbery); Albro v. State,
502 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. 1973) (100 years for possession of marijuana); Angle v. State, 501
S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (2,500 years for murder); Sills v. State, 472 S.W. 119 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971) (1,000 years for robbery). An approach that approves any sentence within the statutory
maximum permits such terms. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment: Sentences
Within Legislatively Determined Limits are not Cruel and Unusual Punishments, 46 Mo. L. REv.
654, 660 (1981). Disparities among jury-imposed sentences also exist in Texas. Compare Goudeau
v. State, 478 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Crim. 1972) (50 years for robbery by assault affirmed) with Grayson
v. State, 468 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Crim. 1971) (8 years for robbery by assault affirmed).
65. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Powell's dissent. 445 U.S. at 285
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was critical of recidivist provisions in an earlier dissent in
which he emphasized the nature of the trigger offense and supposed some necessary relation with the
penalty imposed. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 370-71 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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cruel and unusual punishments clause. Relying on Weems and other non-
capital cases as well as on the death penalty decisions, the dissent felt a con-
stitutional obligation to measure "the relationship between the nature and
number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted
upon the offender."' 66 The eighth amendment polestar must be "evolving
standards of decency." 67 Justice Powell was sensitive to concerns for judi-
cial subjectivity. Again operating within mainstream eighth amendment
doctrine, he fashioned three objective criteria: the nature of the offense;
comparison with sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for commission of
the same crime; and comparison with sentences imposed in the same juris-
diction for commission of other crimes.68 Applying these criteria in the case
at hand could yield but one conclusion: Rummel's sentence violated the
Constitution. First, the nature of the three offenses began the analysis mov-
ing in Rummel's favor. Involving slightly less than $230, the three offenses
were without violence or even the threat of injury.69 Second, the Texas
scheme was dramatically more harsh than other jurisdictions, even the mi-
nority that had chosen to deal with recidivists more severely than other of-
fenders. The federal and the overwhelming majority of state legislative
judgments rejecting a mandatory life sentence for the commission of three
nonviolent felonies were further objective indications of the intolerable gap
between the Texas scheme and contemporary value.70 Third, within the
Texas statutory scheme, first and second offenders who commit more serious
crimes, such as murder, kidnapping, and rape, could receive much less se-
vere sentences. While a life sentence is not inherently barbarous, the dissent-
ers were convinced that Rummel's life sentence for the three felonies he
committed went beyond what the Constitution allows. 71
Two themes made this result inevitable to the dissenters. Objective in-
dicia of evolving standards of decency justified the Court's exercise of its
historic role, first recognized in Weems, as final arbiter of the cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause.72 This theme of historic role distinguished the dis-
sent from the plurality. While the plurality sought to draw a bright line
between capital and all other punishments, the dissent recognized that the
proportionality principle obliged the Court to fashion some principled basis
for measuring the proportionality of sentences short of the ultimate penalty.
Having admitted that some life sentences were disproportionate and uncon-
stitutional, the plurality had in fact committed the Court to make such dis-
66. Id. at 288. See also id. at 288-93.
67. Id. at 292 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
68. 445 U.S. at 295.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 296-300.
71. Id. at 300-03.
72. Courts are exercising no more than the judicial function conferred upon them by Art.
III of the Constitution when they assess, in a case before them, whether or not a particular
legislative enactment is within the authority granted by the Constitution to the enacting
body, and whether it runs afoul of some limitation placed by the Constitution on the au-
thority of that body.
445 U.S. at 303 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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tinctions without explaining how cases beyond Rummel would be decided. 73
It was the plurality and not the dissent that sent the Court down the slippery
slope. The proportionality principle became a value in search of some ana-
lytical rigor. The plurality seemed to admit there was a constitutional
threshold but said little more than Rummel's sentence was not beyond it. In
the name of a "bright line" analysis, no line was drawn and no line-drawing
method was provided.74 Justice Powell's dissent would have extended the
proportionality principle to supply the necessary analysis. 75 It would be the
dissent's analysis that would stop the slide and return the Court to princi-
pled decisionmaking, although not without some further slippage.76
C. Hutto v. Davis
The second precedent in the triology came one year later. In Hutto v.
Davis,77 the Court seemed to make a special effort to reaffirm its holding in
Rummel.78 Roger Trenton Davis was convicted of possession of marijuana
73. The Court was unanimous that some hypothetical limit existed beyond which the legisla-
ture could not go, as, for example, a mandatory life sentence for overtime parking. Compare 445
U.S. at 274 n.1 1 (plurality) with id. at 288, 307 n.25 (dissent). But c. supra note 57 (Justice Stew-
art's separate concurring opinion did not reach the issue).
The hypothetical is not so far-fetched. Several state court decisions have upheld provisions
mandating imprisonment for habitual or repeated traffic offenders against various constitutional at-
tacks. See, eg., Cox v. State, 241 Ga. 154, 244 S.E.2d 1 (1978); State v. Dean, 115 N.H. 520, 345
A.2d 408 (1975); State v. Guiendon, 113 N.J. Super. 361, 273 A.2d 790 (1971); Sterno v. State, 85
Wis. 2d 663, 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978). Justice Blackmun consistently has endorsed harsh enforce-
ment efforts for traffic laws as a response to traffic fatalities. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 104 S. Ct.
2091, 2100 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 657 and 672 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 401 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 920 (1983).
74. See Note, Application of the Proportionality Doctrine to a Punishment of Imprisonment, 35
MERCER L. REV. 681, 689 (1984).
75. See Note, Solem v. Helm: Extending Judicial Review Under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause to Require "Proportionality" of Prison Sentences, 33 CATH. U.L. REv. 479, 496 (1984).
76. As for Rummel's fate, his fortune was better under the sixth amendment. Before the Fifth
Circuit panel, he had argued that his court-appointed trial counsel was ineffective. 590 F.2d at 105.
On remand, the district court agreed and ordered his retrial or release. Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F.
Supp. 783, 798 (W.D. Tex. 1980). In a plea bargain, Rummel agreed to plead guilty to the third
offense of fraudulently obtaining $120.75 and waive all malpractice claims against his original attor-
ney; the District Attorney agreed to (1) drop the state's appeal of the grant of his federal petition,
(2) recommend a sentence less than the time Rummel had served, and (3) not proceed under the
habitual offender statute. On November 14, 1980 Rummel was freed. Comment, supra note 64, at
653 n.6 (citing State v. Rummel, No. 73-CR-214 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Nov. 14, 1980) (order freeing Rum-
mel)). See also Comment, Mandatory Life Sentence Under Recidivist Statute is not Cruel and Unu-
sualPunishment, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 546, 559 n.111 (1981) (citing L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1980, at 1, col.
3; HoUSTON Crry MAGAziN, Jan. 1981, at 8).
77. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
78. The procedural history of Davis demonstrates the Court's apparent commitment to the
Rummel holding. The District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted Davis' § 2254
petition, filed before the Supreme Court's decision in Rummel, under previously-established Fourth
Circuit precedent. Davis v. Zahrdnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 451 (W.D. Va. 1977) (citing Hart v.
Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974)). A panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and upheld the sentence by distinguishing between
sentences for life and sentences for terms of years. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978).
On rehearing, the en banc Fourth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district court's
decision to grant relief, adopting the district court's analysis. Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc). The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and re-
manded for further consideration in light of the after-decided Rummel v. Estelle. Hutto v. Davis,
445 U.S. 947 (1980). An equally-divided en banc Fourth Circuit then disagreed on the precedential
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with intent to distribute and distribution of that marijuana; the amount of
marijuana involved was approximately nine ounces, having a street value of
about $200. A jury imposed a sentence of $10,000 and a twenty-year prison
term on each conviction, the terms to run consecutively. The sentences were
well within the Virginia statutory maxima of a $25,000 fine and forty
years.79
The starting point of the per curiam opinion was Rummel.80 The ma-
jority defended the bright line drawn there between the death penalty, which
differs in kind, and terms of imprisonment, which differ only in duration.
The major premise was that eighth amendment judgments should not be
subjective; the minor premise was that any determination of excessiveness
between two terms of years would be subjective; the conclusion was that
challenges against sentences for terms of years were beyond the constitu-
tional ken of the federal courts. While straightforward, the per cuham's
logic was not self-contained. The Court, once again, admitted the irresist-
able counterexample:8 1 "Rummel stands for the proposition that federal
courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of im-
prisonment,' . . . and that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences 'should be' 'exceedingly rare.' "82 The per curiam opin-
ion thus conceded some role, albeit limited, for the federal courts to review
the lines drawn by the state legislatures.83 The Davis majority simply con-
cluded, virtually, sans analysis, that there was no objective basis for the dis-
trict court's holding.84
Justice Powell in a solo opinion concurred "reluctantly" with the judg-
ment.85 In retrospect, his concurrence in Davis was the fulcrum in the shift
of emphasis occurring in the three decisions. 86 Once again, Justice Powell
impact of Rummel and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d
123, 124 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The decision discussed in the text followed.
As something of a postscript, the Supreme Court majority reprimanded the lower court's action
after the first remand: "[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the
judges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982).
79. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1229 (4th Cir. 1978).
80. "Because the Court of Appeals failed to heed our decision in Rummel, we now reverse."
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. at 372. The per curiam opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
81. Every theory is faced with irresistable counterexamples, those situations in which a consis-
tent application would yield an untoward result. See Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free
Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 107, 113-14 (1982).
82. 454 U.S. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 1138-39).
83. The Court repeated its footnote promise to protect overtime parkers from mandatory life
sentences. Id. at 374 n.3. See supra notes 62 and 70.
84. In a "footnoteworthy" digression, the per curiam opinion rejected each of the district
court's claims to objectivity: (1) the absence of violence cannot control society's interest in criminal-
izing the behavior; (2) evaluating the "smallness" of the amount of marijuana involved (nine ounces)
was inherently subjective; (3) that Davis's sentences for possession with intent to distribute and for
distribution exceeded the maximum sentence in all but four and eight states respectively did not
amount to a constitutional violation; (4) a comparison to sentences in other Virginia crimes was no
more convincingly objective. 454 U.S. at 373 n.2. Perhaps, the Court failed to distinguish between
the first two factors being improper considerations and the last two factors being unpersuasive on the
facts.
85. 454 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring).
86. The precedent-turning concurrence, which at the time of decision reads more like a dissent
but which eventually becomes a majority position, is something of a phenomenon in Supreme Court
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was quick to point out that neither the majority in Rummel nor the majority
in Davis had held that there was no proportionality principle. 87 He admitted
two arguable distinctions between Rummel and the case for decision: a let-
ter from the prosecutor labelling Davis's sentence as "grossly unjust," be-
cause by comparison there was such a "grave disparity in sentencing"
between the sentence and other Virginia sentences in comparable drug of-
fenses and, more importantly, the Virginia legislature later had reduced the
maximum sentence for the same offenses to less than one-half of the sentence
Davis received. 88 Nevertheless, Justice Powell concluded that the Rummel
precedent required reversal by reference to another objective measure: com-
paring Davis's sentence with the sentence upheld in Rummel. Davis's
crimes were more serious and his sentences less severe than Rummel's.
Stare decisis thus served as yet another restraint on the subjectivity of the
judicial assessment of proportionality.89
Three justices dissented and joined an opinion authored by Justice
Brennan.90 The dissent accused the majority of "a serious and improper
expansion of Rummel" which the three Justices read as limited to cases in-
volving the overwhelming state interest to punish recidivists with severe
sentences which otherwise would be disproportionate. 91 Critical that the per
curiam opinion was empty of analysis, the dissent argued that this was one
of those concededly rare cases in which the sentence violated the Constitu-
tion. Intrajurisdictional disparity was the dominant factor, as indicated by
the trial court's comparison of Virginia sentences among drug offenders, the
prosecutor's admission, and the subsequent state legislative reduction.
The Davis decision left the law in an unsatisfying state.92 Rummel, ap-
parently, was reconfirmed and expanded to apply to nonrecidivists. At the
same time, the questions Rummel had left unanswered still remained after
Davis. Indeed, the theoretical ambivalence worsened. A proportionality
principle of amorphous dimension survived both decisions. Yet, by demand-
ing objective criteria while at the same time rejecting all proferred criteria as
being too subjective, the two controlling opinions accomplished a profound
confusion regarding the applicability and the scope of proportionality re-
view.93 The lower courts required better guidance.94
decisionmaking. See, eg., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
87. Therefore, he had no institutional criticism for the trial and appellate courts' willingness to
consider the constitutional challenge. 454 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., dissenting). But see supra note 78.
88. 454 U.S. at 377-79.
89. Id at 379-81.
90. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented. Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 382-83, 386 n.5. The dissent's principal focus was the argued impropriety of sum-
mary disposition in Davis Id at 381, 387. Additionally, the dissent disowned the per curiam's
criticism of the court of appeals and district court. Id. at 388 n.7. See supra notes 75 & 84.
92. See generally Note, supra note 41, at 454-62.
93. See Note, supra note 75, at 501; Note, supra note 74, at 690-91.
94. The lower federal courts spent a lot of time sorting out the Supreme Court's inconsistencies
without much success. See, eg., Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982); Terrebone v. Black-
burn, 646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
State courts had similar problems with the federal question, and a few chose to proceed under
the parallel state constitution. See, e-g., State v. Mulally, 127 Ariz. 92, 618 P.2d 586 (1980); State v.
Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980); State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869 (1980),
cert denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980); Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981).
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D. Solem v. Helm
The guidance came the next Term, only three years after Rummel. So-
lem v. Helm,95 of course, is the "Defendant B" hypothetical. At the time of
sentencing, Jerry Buckley Helm was a thirty-six year old alcoholic and bad-
check artist who had spent much of the previous fifteen years in the peniten-
tiary. His six previous state felonies included: three third-degree burglaries
(1964, 1965, 1969); obtaining money under false pretenses (1972); grand lar-
ceny (1973); and a third-offense of driving while intoxicated (1975). In 1979,
Helm pled guilty to uttering a "no account" check for $100; the ordinary
maximum punishment would have been a $5,000 fine and five years impris-
onment. Under the South Dakota statutory scheme, Helm's record made
him eligible for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which is
what he received.96 After being refused relief in the state appellate system97
and in his § 2254 proceeding in the district court, Helm succeeded in the
Eighth Circuit.98 His success was affirmed in the Supreme Court in a some-
what dramatic fashion.99 Justice Powell, the author of the Rummel dis-
sentic° and the Davis concurrence,10 1 wrote for the Court.10 2
Justice Powell's analysis began with principles of constitutional text and
history. He traced the constitutional value of proportionality back to the
original framers' intent and the received common law. Justice Powell relied
on a century of Supreme Court precedents, pausing to note "the leading
case" of Weems and also Robinson and the capital punishment line of
cases.10 3 Emphasizing the need for deference first, to the paramount author-
ity of the legislature in determining general limits and second, to the in-
formed discretion of trial courts in sentencing particular offenders, the
majority still held "as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be
95. 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
96. Helm's offenses and the South Dakota statutes are set out id at 3004-05. The case history
before Supreme Court consideration is chronicled in Note, Helm v. Solem: Can A Prison Sentence
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 36 ARK. L. REv. 673, 682-87 (1983); Note, supra note
75, at 501-03; Note, Helm v. Solem: A Favorable Decision For Recidivists Facing Life Sentences
Without Parole, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 663, 675-79 (1983).
97. State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1980). Two justices would have reversed and re-
manded for resentencing and two justices affirmed the sentence; the justice who cast the deciding
vote concurred with the affirmance based on the state clemency statutes. Id. at 499.
98. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982). The panel distinguished Rummel and Davis,
presaging the Supreme Court's treatment of Helm as an important new development in proportion-
ality analysis. Id. at 584-85.
99. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 65-76.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
102. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
Like that of his Brother Blackmun, see infra text accompanying notes 124-32, Justice Powell's eighth
amendment orientation has evolved over the years. In the first death penalty series, Justice Powell
assumed a very deferential posture toward the legislature. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 422
n.4, 451 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). In the second series, he aligned with those approving guided
discretion statutes and striking down mandatory statutes. See Profflitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976). Later, Justice Powell voted to void the death penalty for rape, but carefully sought to nar-
row the plurality's opinion. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 433, 602 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Most notably, he abandoned the deferential posture and accepted the
eighth amendment responsibility to apply the Court's own judgment. Id. at 603 n.2. See id at 607
n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting Justice Powell's "disquieting shift"). See generally Radin,
supra note 45.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 3007-09. See supra Part II.A.
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proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted."' 104
Such deference necessarily means that successful proportionality challenges
will be rare, but objective factors inform when the usual deference is consti-
tutionally inapposite: (1) a comparison of the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (2) a comparison with sentences imposed for other
crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison with sentences im-
posed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 105 The conceded relativity of
these three criteria does not reduce them to purely subjective and completely
idiosyncratic measures. Courts are assumed competent to make such broad
comparisons of crime, criminal and sentence; evaluating harm, determining
culpability, and linedrawing are standard techniques of the judicial art.10 6
The Court's application to the case at hand is instructive. The trigger crime
of uttering a $100 no-account check was passive, non-violent, and involved a
relatively small amount. The conviction of recidivism, however, made rele-
vant all of Helm's priors, which the Court characterized as nonviolent, rela-
tively minor, and property offenses. As for sentence, life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was the most severe punishment available in
South Dakota. Thus, the first criteria suggested an imbalance between crime
and punishment.10 7 Second, the Court reviewed the entire legislative scheme
of authorized punishments in the state, considering the context of the recidi-
vist sentence. Only a few of the most serious crimes were mandatorily pun-
ished by life imprisonment; for a larger group, such a sentence was
authorized; and such a sentence was not authorized for a large group of very
serious offenses. The record indicated that in the state no one other than
Helm was given a life sentence for comparable crimes. Thus, the Court con-
cluded that Helm's life sentence was equivalent or more severe than South
Dakota imposed for much more serious crimes.108 Third, the Court consid-
ered the sentence in the national context and concluded that Helm would
have received a less severe punishment in every other state. 109 Finally, con-
sistent with its case-by-case approach, the majority distinguished the Texas
parole system in Rummel from the executive commutation system in South
Dakota, thus, distinguishing the former precedent.110 Rummel had not
presented the Court with a sufficiently stabilized sentence on which to base
an objective disproportionality analysis. Helm did. Mandatory life impris-
onment without parole is second only to the death penalty in its complete
and permanent deprival of fundamental existence. Before such a punish-
ment can be imposed, the Constitution's threshold prohibiting apparent
104. 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
105. Id. at 3011.
106. The majority rewarded close readers with some illustrations of the analysis. Widely shared
views consider violent crime more serious. A lesser included offense should not be punished more
severely than the greater inclusive offense. Traditional concepts of mental state and motive differen-
tiate among offenders. On a case-by-case basis, one sentence of imprisonment may be distinguished
from another. Id. at 3011-12.
107. Id. at 3013.
108. Id. at 3014.
109. Only in Nevada would a life sentence without parole even have been possible and the actual
experience with that sentence there involved far more serious series of offenses. Id. at 3014-15.
110. Id. at 3015-17, 3017 n.32.
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grossly disproportionate sentences must be overcome; the threshold was not
overcome in Helm.
Four Justices dissented in a very intense opinion authored by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, beginning, "[T]oday the Court blithely discards any concept of
stare decisis, trespasses gravely on the authority of the States, and distorts
the concept of proportionality. . . ... I The dissent's principal point was
that Rummel controlled and had "categorically rejected the very analysis
adopted by the Court .... "112 That rejection had been repeated, according
to the dissent, in Davis.'1 3 Still the dissenters recognized a limited, though
subjective, role for eighth amendment proportionality analysis.' 4 Reading
the intellectual development of the amendment more narrowly, the dissent
accused the majority of distorting history, commentary, and case law. 115
Despairing at what they viewed as a "bald substitution of individual subjec-
tive moral values," the dissenters recast the Court's holding: "What the
Court means is that a sentence is unconstitutional if it is more severe than
five justices think appropriate."' 16 They rejected the proffered analysis as
standardless, a characteristic which they feared would flood the appellate
courts.117 All these criticisms had as backdrop an announced concern for
the constitutional values of federalism and separation of powers.
The Helm dissent is correct in one important regard: the permutations
of questions this triology raises are virtually endless." 8 Our purpose here is
to ask the relevant questions and begin to answer them within some princi-
pled framework.
III. RECONCILIATION
Our respect for the Constitution and the article III role of the Supreme
Court demands that "not only what the Supreme Court does but most of
what it says in support of what it does" must be taken seriously. 119 There-
fore, we are left with the task of reconciliation of these three proportionality
precedents. It is possible to draw three figures around the proportionality
constellation of Rummel, Davis, and Helm. Charting the Court, from prece-
dent to precedent to precedent, provides its own reward in a richer apprecia-
tion for the values in conflict.
A. Changes Among the Justices
One figure around the three precedents may be drawn by counting
votes. We may begin by comparing the votes in Rummel and Helm.120
Ill. Id. at 3017 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined the
Chief Justice's dissent.
112. Id. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also id at 3017-20, 3022-23.
113. Id. at 3020 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
114. "I agree that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might apply to those rare cases
where reasonable men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a punishment." Id at 3020 n.3.
115. Id. at 3021.
116. Id. at 3022, 3017.
117. Id. at 3022.
118. Id.
119. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1979).
120. See supra notes 56, 65, 102 and 111.
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First, Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart. Since Justice O'Connor
voted with the plurality in Rummel and Justice Stewart voted with the dis-
sent in Helm, that personnel change cannot explain the development of the
proportionality doctrine. 121 The most significant change came, not in per-
sonnel, but in the vote of one Justice. Justice Blackmun voted against the
proportionality claim in Rummel but voted in favor of the proportionality
claim in Helm. All the remaining Justices stayed on the same side of the
issue.122 The decisions were that close and that difficult. 123
We are left without an opinion by Justice Blackmun, however, in any of
the three decisions. Justice Blackmun's earlier constitutional philosophy has
been summarized as emphasizing "judicial restraint, an appreciation for the
limits of judicial authority and deference to state and legislative preroga-
tives." 124 That philosophy is consistent with his Rummel vote in favor of
the Texas sentence. Yet, he has been described as capable of "astonishing
judicial leaps," 125 which, perhaps, may be illustrated by his vote in Helm to
strike the South Dakota sentence. But noting a capability does not explain
its exercise. One attractive explanation is that his two votes, three years
apart, are part of an overall change in Justice Blackmun's social vision con-
cerning the Court's institutional role and his personal role within the institu-
tion.1 26 His death-penalty votes suggest a similar shift in position.' 2 7 The
121. Preliminary evaluations by court-watchers of Justice O'Connor suggest that her replace-
ment of Justice Stewart would not make the Court more sympathetic to a proportionality claim. See
Riggs, Justice O'Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11-12, 16, 20; Schenker,
"Reading" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 487, 503 (1982). Indeed, Justice
O'Connor voted with the Rummel plurality in Davis without the ambiguity Justice Stewart had
shown in the earlier case. See supra notes 57 and 80. In available statistics, at least, Justice
O'Connor seems more often aligned with the conservative justices than was Justice Stewart. See The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. Rv. 70, 305 (1983) (five-year-average voting alignments).
122. The Rummel division was Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun and
Rehnquist versus Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell and Stevens. See supra notes 57 and 66. The
Helm division was Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens versus Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. After Rummel and before Helm, one com-
mentator suggested a strategy that proved right for the wrong reason: "A lawyer could try to prove
to the Court that Rummel was based on such a false premise [a utilitarian justification for recidivist
provisions] and thereby persuade one of the Justices in the slim majority of five to change his vote."
Dressler, supra note 9, at 1119.
123. Later events seem to support Professor Lasson's post-Rummel inference that Justice Black-
mun was the swing vote in that decision. Lasson, Rummel v. Estelle: Mockingbirds Among the
Brethren, 18 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 441, 442 (1981) ("Once again I started drawing my decision,
hemming, hawing, / Still the burning question gnawing. . . ."). Cf Blackmun, Some Goals for
Legal Education, 1 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 403, 408 (1974) ("Judgment, judgment judgment. It grows
by experience and it grows by learning."). See also supra notes 65 and 101.
124. POLLET, HARRY A. BLACKMUN, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT-THEIR LIVEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 3, 8 (L. Friedman ed. 1978) (quoted in Comment,
Justice Harry A. Blackmun: The Abortion Decisions, 34 ARK. L. REv. 276, 276 n.1 (1980)).
125. Id.
126. See generally Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96 HARv. L. REv.
717 (1983). See supra note 124. One veteran court-watcher has suggested that Justice O'Connor's
ascendency also has pushed Justice Blackmun toward a more liberal view. Denniston, Sandra Day
O'Connor: First-term Review, CAL. LAw, Feb. 1983, at 29. See supra note 121.
127. Justice Blackmun did not write an opinion but voted to uphold the death penalty in the
second set of companion cases. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). That vote was consis-
tent, however, with his deferential dissent from the earlier decision to declare the death penalty
unconstitutional:
To reverse the judgments in these cases, of course, is the easy choice. It is easier to
strike the balance in favor of life and against death. It is comforting to relax in the
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problem is that we do not know. It is not too much to ask for an explanation
of the deciding vote in two cases so close in time, facts, and majority. 128 If
the eighth amendment is to be reduced to Justice Blackmun's thumb-up or
thumb-down vote based on his intuitive judgment of justice in the particular
case, that, at least, should be made clear.129 When Justice Blackmun has
concluded that we are, to use his words, "moving down the road toward
human decency,"13 0 at least, he should tell us. We do not accept, however,
the "I know it when I see it" theory of constitutional law.131 Nor, we be-
lieve, does Justice Blackmun. The cases must be distinguishable or the
Court has failed to adhere to its own principle of stare decisis. Perhaps,
stare decisis cannot reconcile two cases which all but one Justice saw as
irreconcilable, but again, the search deepens understanding. We must
"grapple with the complexities and tensions in the 'close cases'," always em-
phasizing both the human dignity at stake and the Court's critical role in
realizing the constitutional potential.132
B. The Announced Stare Decisis
The second figure around the precedents is the one drawn by the Court:
thoughts-perhaps the rationalizations-that this is the compassionate decision for a ma-
turing society; that this is the moral and the "right" thing to do ....
This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense. But it is good argument and
it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way and not as a judicial expedient.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Consistent with his unex-
plained shift in the proportionality cases, Justice Blackmun later joined but did not write in the
principal opinion invalidating the death penalty for rape. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
128. The truest insights may be had in a Justice's solo opinion. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criti-
cizing the Court, 95 Htv. L. REv. 802, 832 (1982). Veteran court-watchers may recall Justice
Douglas and development of the current per se rule favoring searches with warrants. That shift was
just as significant, dramatic, and unexplained. Justice Douglas participated in the majority in Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), which adopted a reasonableness orientation to warrantless
searches. The majority relied upon Justice Douglas' earlier opinion for the Court in Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946). One year later without explanation, Justice Douglas voted with the
Harris dissenters to adopt a per se rule declaring warrantless searches unconstitutional except in
limited circumstances. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Perhaps, Justice Douglas
explained his shift and Justice Blackmun's in the front piece to his autobiography by quoting Persian
poet Jalal-Ud-Din Rura: "All your anxiety is because of your desire for harmony. Seek dishar-
mony; then you will gain peace." W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARs viii
(1974).
129. See Note, supra note 126, at 725, 736.
130. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), commented on
and explained in Cox, Hard-core Pornography Defined: A Note on Misinterpretation, 84 CASE &
CoM. (May-June 1979) at 36.
No one openly would prefer such a substitution of will for reasoning as to say "I have 5 votes,
that is how I distinguish the contrary decisions," so the contrary precedents do not control.
Monaghan, supra note 119, at 19. See supra text accompanying note 116.
132. Justice Blackmun's judicial approach emerges not as a series of doctrinal corollaries
formally derivable from idiological postulates, but rather as a continuing effort to grapple
with the complexities and tensions in the "close" cases before the Court. Though not
always tidy or predictable, such a search has impelled Justice Blackmun to emphasize the
human dimension in the cases confronting him.
Note, supra note 126, at 736.
One explanation for Justice Blackmun's silence is that he has changed his mind simply on the
strength of the Helm opinion he joined. In a similar situation, Justice Stewart once took refuge in an
aphorism by Justice Frankfurter: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it




the announced stare decisis. While basic, the concept of stare decisis has
been surprisingly mercurial within the common law system generally, and
constitutional law, particularly. 133 The mechanism of precedent has three
stages: (1) identification of a prior decision similar to the case to be decided;
(2) discernment of the rule of law inherent in the prior decision; and (3) ap-
plication of the rule of law to the case to be decided. 134 Most important to
this theory is that the deciding court, or at least a majority, controls stare
decisis by its own view of the prior precedent. The reach of the facts, rule,
and rationale of a prior decision is not controlled by the prior court, but by
the deciding court's majority in identification, discernment, and applica-
tion.135 Thus, the Court's own efforts at recondilation of the three-decision
sequence must be considered.
How the Rummel precedent was used successively in Davis and Helm is
of immediate concern here. In the two later decisions, Davis and Helm, all
the Justices agreed in the "identification" of Rummel as the operative prece-
dent.136 Disagreement centered on the "discernment" and "application"
stages.
The Davis majority opinion 137 simply read Rummel as placing the
length of sentences for terms of years beyond the judicial domain in all but
"exceedingly rare" situations; the sentence before the Court was not an "ex-
ceedingly rare" situation. 38 The line between the death penalty and all
other sentences was defended. Justice Powell's concurring opinion discerned
the same "rarity" principle and applied it by comparing the crimes and
sentences involved in the two cases to conclude that the disproportionality in
Rummel had been greater.' 3 9 The Davis dissent, first and more significant,
would have limited Rummel to recidivist sentences, and second, would have
labelled the Davis sentence disproportionate. 140
The Helm majority opinion then had both Rummel and Davis to recon-
cile. 14' Davis was deemed little more than a reaffirmation of Rummel.142
Discernment of the Rummel principle, however, sharply divided the
133. See Monaghan, supra note 119, at 5-6. See also generally Mykkeltvedt, Ratio Decidendi or
Obiter Dicta?: The Supreme Court and Modes of Precedent Transformation, 15 GA. L. REV. 311
(1981).
134. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-3 (1949). We acknowledge, of
course, that Professor Levi's approach is but one of many competing frameworks. See Baker, Prece-
dent Times Three Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 712-17 (1981). While
Professor Levi's theory claims virtually no role for stare decisis in constitutional law, E. LEVI, supra,
at 8, we believe his framework aids understanding of the principal three cases. It seems to be the
prevailing formal approach in constitutional law today. See Monaghan, supra note 119, at 8-9.
135. For a non-constitutional, hypothetical example, see Baker, supra note 134, at 713-17.
136. The succeeding majorities appeared unwilling to overrule precedent but very willing to re-
cast and distinguish prior holdings. Indeed, this seems to be very characteristic of proportionality
stare decisis. See Note, supra note 75, at 504; Note, supra note 74, at 694. How the Rummel plural-
ity dealt with prior precedent will be important in later discussion. See infra text accompanying
notes 156-72.
137. See supra notes 72-94.
138. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. at 373-74. One could consider the Court's prior remand as having
established as much; the majority, at least, seemed to be of that view. Id. See supra note 78.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
142. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010 n.17, 3016-17 n.32.
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Court.143 For the Helm majority, Rummel and Davis in tandem established
little principle for decision, only that successful proportionality challenges
must be rare. 44 Because the prior two precedents admitted the possibility
but offered no guidance for determining the proportionality issue, the Helm
majority deemed itself free to develop its own analytical framework within
the factual constraints of the two prior cases.' 45 The Court devised the
three-factor objective framework summarized above146 and distinguished
both earlier precedents. Implicitly, the life without parole term before the
Court was an order of magnitude more severe than Davis's forty years.' 47
Rummel was left to be distinguished. Indeed, South Dakota urged that
Rummel was essentially the same case. The majority answered that there
was a constitutional difference, however, based on the distinction between
the possibility of parole there and the possibility of executive clemency in
Helm.' 48 While parole is a normal expectation and governed by specific
legal standards, executive commutation is an ad hoc exercise without articul-
able standards. Besides its rarity- no life sentence had been commuted in
the state in eight years-executive clemency only would render Helm eligi-
ble for parole consideration. According to the Helm deciding Court, the
Texas parole system had been critical to the factual holding in Rummel and
distinguished that case.' 49 With Davis and Rummel limited to their facts
and distinguished, the Helm majority deemed itself free to apply the objec-
tive three-part analysis and to hold Helm's sentence unconstitutional.15 0
143. See supra text accompanying notes 111-117.
144. While the Court had never invalidated a prison sentence solely on the basis of excessive
length, the Helm majority was careful to emphasize that that possibility had always been admitted.
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
145. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3016-17 n.32. Not so for the dissenters, who believed that the
Rummel Court was not simply summarizing an argument but was affirmatively stating a rule of
constitutional law. Id at 3018-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
147. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3016 n.31 (mathematical comparison with Rummel hypothe-
sizing a commutation to a term of forty years). Perhaps because of the summary disposition in
Davis, see supra note 91, or the anonymity of the per curiam opinion, the Davis decision played a
minor role in Helm. Recall that Justice Powell concurred separately because he deemed Rummel's
sentence to have been more severe. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 376 (1982) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). As the author of Helm, it must have been even more obvious to him that a life sentence
without parole was greater than a forty-year sentence. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
The Helm dissent, on the contrary, discerned more from Davis. The dissent's reading of Davis
was that only when "reasonable men could not differ about the appropriateness of [the] punishment"
could a court hold that a sentence within legislative limits is disproportionate and unconstitutional.
Id. at 3020 n.3.
148. Id at 3015. One related argument might distinguish the two decisions. Rummel's life
sentence was mandatory under the Texas statutes; the South Dakota statutes in Helm merely author-
ized a maximum life sentence with no minimum required. Thus, a concern for deference toward a
legislative judgment was less direct in Helm. Cf Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3014 n.26. See
generally Comment, Eighth Amendment-Cruel and Unusual Punishment Habitual Offender's Life
Sentence Without Parole is Disproportionate, 74 J. C iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1372, 1381-82 (1983).
149. 103 S. Ct. at 3015 n.28 and 3016. The deciding court's dissent in Helm disagreed with this
characterization of the Rummel parole discussion and considered the alleged difference as marginal,
particularly since Helm demonstrated a greater personal propensity for more serious crimes. Id. at
3023 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Helm dissent seemed to have the better view of precedent in
this regard. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 293-95 (Powell, J., dissenting). Parole is not a
matter of right and executive clemency may not be arbitrary. The distinction is expedient but some-
what unconvincing. Comment, supra note 148, at 1380-81.
150. Id at 3012-15. See also Note, supra note 12, at 130.
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The dissent twice disagreed. First, the dissent discerned an additional rule
from the Rummel precedent: besides the rule of strict rarity, the nondecid-
ing court in Rummel had specifically rejected and preempted the Helm ma-
jority's objective analysis. According to the dissent, there was no gap to
fill. 151 Second, the Helm dissent disagreed with the majority's application of
its objective analysis and would have concluded that Helm's sentence was
constitutional.15 2
Thus, within this case sequence, Helm has explained Rummel and Da-
vis. The Court's reconciliation has harmonized the decisions, however, only
by an admittedly strained reading of the precedents. 153 Successful propor-
tionality challenges against sentences of imprisonment-either for life or for
a term of years-are rare, but possible. Objective comparative factors that
inform judicial review of sentences are: (1) a comparison of the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) a comparison of sentences
imposed for the same crime in the same jurisdictions; and (3) a comparison
with sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. For now,
stare decisis at least reaches a life sentence without possibility of parole im-
posed for the crimes Helm committed.154 Beyond that, future deciding
courts are left with questions about how to discern and apply the rule in
Helm.' 55
C. The Real Stare Decisis
The Court's announced reconciliation seems strained and artificial.
Paying closer attention to what the Court did, as opposed to how it de-
scribed what it was doing, suggests a third, and perhaps the truer, shape for
the constellation drawn around these three decisions.
Rummel and Helm followed two distinct analyses for evaluating pro-
portionality claims. 156 The Rummel methodology was generalized. The
plurality emphasized the rarity of successful claims, rejected specific com-
parisons of the sentences, and found controlling the states' interest in pun-
ishing recidivists as a category of offenders deserving harsh sentences. In
contrast, the Helm methodology was particularized. The majority strove for
objectivity in comparatively evaluating the crime, the offender, and the sen-
tence. These two methodolgies are directly opposed.
On close reading, Davis may provide some explanation. 157 The dissent
in Davis objected to the improper expansion of Rummel beyond recidivist
151. 104 S. Ct. at 3017-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In this regard, the dissent also relied on
Davis as having definitively rejected the majority's analysis. Id. at 3020 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam)).
152. Id at 3022-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
153. We are not as comfortable with this technique as the Court seems to be. Compare Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) with Wisconsin v. Constintineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). It is, however,
one step removed from simply ignoring precedents which strongly suggest a contrary result. Com-
pare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
154. Thus, the significance of Helm may be limited because only South Dakota and Nevada have
recidivism sentences of life without parole. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3014-15.
155. We will speculate about some answers to those questions later in this essay. See infra Part
IV.
156. See generally Note, supra note 96, at 679-83.
157. See generally Note, supra note 74, at 694-98.
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sentences. It may be that the Helm majority was responding to the cumula-
tive effect of Rummel and Davis, which arguably placed authorized terms of
imprisonment for years beyond the reach of the Constitution. By limiting
Rummel to its own facts, the Helm decision broadly reaffirmed the text and
history of the eighth amendment and prior holdings that "no penalty is per
se constitutional."' 158 This is curious because Rummel just as carefully had
narrowed the proportionality principle. To pretend-that all three holdings
have survived creates quite a labyrinth. First, the deciding court must con-
sider whether the case on decision falls within the shadows of Rummel and
Davis. This threshold determination seems virtually standardless and,
within the doctrine of stare decisis, necessarily involves a large degree of
subjectivity in deciding that a particular sentence is more or less proportion-
ate than the sentences upheld in Rummel and Davis. If Helm does, in fact,
achieve a constitutionally satisfactory level of judicial objectivity, this pre-
liminary Rummel-Davis factual evaluation should be dismissed as surplus-
age. 159 This, then, is the rub between Rummel and Davis, on the one hand,
and Helm on the other. The first two decisions, Rummel and Davis, seem to
assign a lesser weight while the most recent decision, Helm, assigns a greater
weight to the same constitutional value of proportionality. How can we
conclude anything else but that one approach is wrong? 
To be sure, stare decisis in constitutional matters is a fragile concept. 16 1
There are as many ways to "follow" a precedent as there are to dispatch
one. 162 Under a last-decided-best-decided theory of stare decisis, any pro-
portionality analysis would begin and end with Helm. The dissent in Helm
clearly stated that the majority had, in effect, overruled Rummel and Da-
vis.16 3 After all, the Helm majority reads like the Rummel dissent. The au-
thor of the Helm majority and the Rummel dissent was the same Justice and
all but one Justice viewed the two cases as the same. 64 The same text, his-
tory, and precedents Rummel had narrowed were broadened in Helm. The
expansion and refinement of eighth amendment jurisprudence asked for and
refused in Rummel was offered again and accepted in Helm. The Helm
analysis seems drafted to refute the Rummel rationale. Most importantly,
Helm is more consistent with the policies implied in the text, history of the
eighth amendment, and precedents. Argued distinctions, when realistically
viewed, seem ephemeral. Indeed, one very likely discernment and applica-
158. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009.
159. See generally Note, supra note 12, at 130-36. Alternatively, we might suggest that Rummel
has gone the way of other endangered species of precedent which have been preserved only to be
confined as curiosities with little importance beyond themselves. See, eg., Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
160. See Easterbrook, supra note 128, at 812 n.26.
161. The Court's power to overrule past interpretations of the Constitution, as distinguished
from the particular wisdom of its exercise, is not of great controversy. See generally Blaustein &
Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 151 (1958); Israel, Gideon v.
Wainwright: The "A rt" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 211; Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death
of Stare Decisis on Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 467.
162. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TaADrnON 77-91 (1960) (collecting
methods).
163. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3017, 3019, 3020-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Cf also
Dressier, supra note 9, at 1089-95; Gardner, supra note 45, at 1112.
164. See supra Part III.A.
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tion of Helm by some future deciding court may be that Rummel and Davis
have been overruled. It is not uncommon for the Court to struggle and
strain to avoid overruling a prior decision, only to admit at the next occasion
of precedent that it was unsuccessful in its efforts at preservation. 165 Helm
may be the latest example of this technique. 166 The Helm majority leaves
the impression that if the Rummel facts had been presented after the deci-
sion in Helm, Rummel would have been decided differently. Comparing
Justice Powell's two opinions, his Rummel dissent and his Helm majority
opinion, bolsters this impression. 167 This was pointed out by the Helm dis-
senters.1 68 Helm is really a rejection of Rummel. Past precedents, at least
arguably, supported both approaches. While it is possible to view the deci-
sions as parallel and in coexistent tension preserving two tracks of reasoning,
the Helm Court has done all within its power to uproot the Rummel ap-
proach. This effort will not escape the notice and respect of some future
deciding court. If nothing else, the Helm decision appears to have estab-
lished some consistency in an otherwise incongruous case law.169
165. A paradigm example of this technique may be found in the recent shopping center cases.
First, in Amalgated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court
held that the incorporated first amendment protected a labor union's peaceful picketing of a nonun-
ion retail store in a shopping center. Four years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972), the Court struggled and strained to distinguish Logan Valley on its facts and narrowed it so
as not to apply to picketing unrelated to the shopping center's operations. The dissent in the second
decision found "no valid distinction" between the two cases. Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting). So
it was to be. A third case, factually indistinguishable from the first, forced the issue. In Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the majority admitted that the reasoning and holding in the two previ-
ous decisions could not be reconciled and that the second had in fact overruled the first decision.
Thus, a future deciding court may hold that Helm overruled Rummel. See also Israel, supra note
159, at 223-26.
166. Cynically, Rummel may be viewed as surviving merely as a convenient citation for summa-
rily handling most challenges against sentences. Note, supra note 12, at 133. The Court used this
technique in obscenity cases during the 1960s. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82-
83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, one potential liability of Helm's ambiguous treatment of precedent is that the Rum-
mel holding and reasoning may be resuscitated. For example, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), revitalized Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), after it had been
eulogized in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). While such tergiversation is uncom-
mon, its possibility is worth noting. See H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING 62-63
(1979).
167. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting) with Solem v. Helm,
103 S. Ct. at 3001.
168. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3017, 3018-20, 3022-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
169. But see Maltz, supra note 161, at 467 ("if a majority of the Warren or Burger Court has
considered a case wrongly decided, no constitutional precedent-new or old-has been safe"). Jus-
tice Powell, the author of the Rummel dissenting and the Helm majority opinions, once explained
his own view of precedents under the Constitution:
To be sure, stare decisis promotes the important considerations of consistency and predict-
ability in judicial decisions and represents a wise and appropriate policy in most instances.
But that doctrine has never been thought to stand as an absolute bar to reconsideration of a
prior decision, especially with respect to matters of constitutional interpretation. Where
the Court errs in its construction of a statute, correction may always be accomplished by
legislative action. Revision of a constitutional interpretation, on the other hand, is often
impossible as a practical matter, for it requires the cumbersome route of constitutional
amendment. It is thus not only our prerogative but also our duty to re-examine a prece-
dent where its reasoning or understanding of the Constitution is fairly called into question.
And if the precedent or its rationale is of doubtful validity, then it should not stand. As
Mr. Chief Justice Taney commented more than a century ago, a constitutional decision of
this Court should be "always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded
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Still another phenomenon of constitutional stare decisis would achieve
the same effect and might appeal to some future deciding court. Retrospec-
tively, the Court occasionally has come to realize that a particular decision
within a line of precedents is inconsistent with underlying themes and values
and therefore must be culled.170 Within the history of the proportionality
doctrine, Rummel may be viewed as the aberration. 171 The Rummel major-
ity opinion strained to distinguish and limit prior precedents; some future
court well may conclude that the Rummel majority acted too procrustean.
Helm may signal a return to the proper solicitude for the proportionality
principle. While Rummel sought to narrow the principle by applying it only
to punishments "different in kind," Helm suggested that the principle ap-
plied to all punishments. 172 Some future deciding court may conclude that
Rummel must be culled from proportionality precedent.
Overruling Rummel by either approach will give consistency to the pro-
portionality area. Rummel and Helm were made possible through the coex-
istence of conflicting holdings and precedents. That we have strained so
much and failed so completely in our effort at reconciliation makes it clear
that the decisions are inconsistent. Logic may overtake this part of the law
yet.
IV. BEYOND HOLDINGS
Having described the proportionality principle and having explored a
few permutations of the recent triology, it is necessary to go beyond the
holdings to complete the analysis. To understand the present and likely fu-
ture state of the art, the recent trilogy must be considered on two more
levels. First, we suggest a new synthesis which is justified against concerns
for important values in federalism, separated powers and judicial restraint.
Next, we will evaluate our synthesis against shared understandings by con-
sidering how lawyers and judges have approached the proportionality issues
in decisions since the trilogy.
A. "Facial" and "As Applied" Challenges
A few basic points serve as helpful background. Three principles may
be distilled from the eighth amendment, only one of which is of concern.
First, there is a limit on the power of the legislature to impose inhumane or
barbarous modes of punishment. 173 "[B]urning at the stake, crucifixion,
in error, [so] that [our] judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of
the reasoning by which it is supported.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
170. One classic example comes to mind. In 1962, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
overruled the twenty year old Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), for precisely that reason. See
generally Israel, supra note 159.
171. Most commentators have so viewed Rummel See, eg., Dressler, supra note 9, at 1090-94;
Gardner, supra note 45, at 1129; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 75, 95 (1980);
Note, supra note 12, at 135 n.135; Note, supra note 96, at 674; But see Schwartz, supra note 10, at
420.
172. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272-74 with Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010
n.17, 3012 n.18 and 3016 n.32. See Note, supra note 74, at 695-96.
173. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); Granucci, supra note 10, at 847. See also
supra note 5.
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breaking on the wheel, or the like" are out of constitutional fashion. 174 Sec-
ond, the constitutional provision limits the power of the legislature to define
certain conduct as criminal.17 - The flu cannot be made felonious.' 76 Third,
the Constitution obliges the legislature to proportion punishment to the
crime. This Article, of course, is concerned with the third concept. The
proportionality concept must, however, be refined by employing a standard
constitutional law technique-the "facial" and "as applied" distinction.
Some penalties are disproportionate on their face. This is to say that
the state is forbidden to impose the challenged penalty on any person guilty
of the particular crime. 177 "Facial" challenges are none too successful; ra-
tionality is enough and even legislatures can usually achieve it.178 This is
precisely not what we are concerned with here. "Facial" challenges, of
course, are related to "as applied" challenges, but the two analyses are dis-
tinct.179 The decisions we have discussed here have involved "as applied"
challenges in which the only constitutional issue is the proportionality of the
specific sentence imposed on the individual defendant.
The disproportionate-as-applied challenge is a refinement of the tradi-
tional argument that an otherwise neutral enactment has been "applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand."' 80
The statutorily authorized sentence is not at all challenged in the abstract;
context is an added refinement. Context may include disparity among
sentences for the same offense, total cumulative sentences, the breadth of
conduct included in the offense, and punishment enhancements.'18 The de-
fendant's argument is that whatever the constitutionality of the sentence in
the abstract, his unique sentence defies the eighth amendment. The combi-
nation of the legislative authorization of penalty with the judicial implemen-
tation of sentence has resulted in a fundamental error. A constitutional
process-legislative enactment and judicial application-has reached an un-
constitutional result. The distinction is basic but crucial. In Rummel, for
example, the argument was not that the Texas recidivist statute or its
174. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446.
175. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See also supra notes 42-45.
176. "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having
a common cold." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 667.
177. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3006, 3009.
Language in Supreme Court opinions has long taken this precept for granted. Coker v. Geor-
gia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
178. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3006, 3009. See also Note, An Excessively Long Sentence
Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Davis v. Davis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 821, 824-28
(1980); Note, supra note 41, at 447-49; Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970) (collecting cases).
179. The relatedness to "as applied" analysis is obvious. The facial question is "whether a statu-
torily authorized sentence comports with the eighth amendment's core concept of the dignity of
man: proportionality in relation to the penalties prescribed for other offenses and compatibility with
the contemporary standards of just punishment embodied in the penal codes of sister states." Note,
supra note 8, at 1136. Facial challenges are beyond the scope of our essay. See generally id. at 1136-
53.
180. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). But see Schwartz, supra note 10, at 412-
14.
181. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1153-67.
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mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional. Controlling precedent estab-
lished the facial validity of the Texas statute' 8 2 and the states' greater inter-
est in dealing more harshly with habitual offenders withstands most
constitutional challenges. 183 Instead, Rummel unsuccessfully argued that
his sentence did not satisfy the "as applied" proportionality principle.18 4
The issue becomes uniquely factbound by sentence and offender.1 85 Further-
more, the issue becomes virtually incomprehensible upon close examination
of such institutionalized disparaties as jury sentencing and sentencing judges'
penological philosophies. Perhaps, too close a scrutiny will blur the analysis
as much as an unfocused inquiry.
B. Challenges Against Terms of Years
Stated simply, an "as applied" challenge may be launched against any
disproportionate sentence for a term of years. To so conclude, we must es-
tablish the application of the proportionality principle beyond life imprison-
ments under recidivist provisions and without regard to whether parole is
prohibited.
Although Rummel and Helm involved life sentences and habitual of-
fender statutes, there is no reason to limit their combined effect to such stat-
utes.186  First, Davis should be considered as precedent for applying
proportionality analysis to ordinary sentences for terms of years. 187
Although the Davis Court reaffirmed Rummel and upheld the forty-year
sentence under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, the Court care-
fully saved the possibility that some hypothetical sentence would violate the
Constitution. 18  Furthermore, the majority seemed to concede sub silentio,
that its proportionality holdings applied to sentences of terms of years. Jus-
182. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). See supra note 57.
183. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. at 560. See, eg., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (due
process); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (ex post facto); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616 (1912) (double jeopardy); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901) (cruel and unusual
punishments); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (cruel and unusual punishments). See gener-
ally L. BERKSON, supra note 10, at 75-79; Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21
BUFFALO L. REv. 99, 113-15 (1971); Note, A Closer Look at Habitual Criminal Statutes Brown v.
Parratt and Martin v. Parratt, A Case Study of the Nebraska Law, 16 AM. CRiM. L. Rnv. 275, 282
(1978); Note, Habitual Criminal Statute 12.42(d)-Open Door to Disproportionate Sentences 29 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 629 (1977); Note, Don't Steal a Turkey in Arkansas--The Second Felony Offender in
New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 76 (1976); Note, The Habitual CriminalAct Quantity of Convic-
tions Only?, 59 NEB. L. REv. 507 (1980); Note, Recidivist Laws Under the Eighth Amendment, l0 U.
TOL. L. REv. 606 (1979).
Most intriguing is the suggestion that "[m]ost state recidivist statutes do not conform to the
requirements announced in Helm." Note, Solem v. Helm: Proportionality Review of Recidivist Sen-
tencing is Required by the Eighth Amendment, 33 DE PAUL L. RPv. 149, 172 (1983). See also
generally Dressler, supra note 9. But cf State v. Freeman, 669 S.W.2d 688 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)
(upholding state statute against facial challenge).
184. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 268-69.
185. See Browne v. Estelle, 544 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977); Hart v. Coiner, 487 F.2d 136 (4th Cir.
1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). See generally Note, supra note 180, at 174-75; Annot., 33
A.L.R.3d 335 (1970) (exemplary citations).
186. See Gardner, supra note 45, at 1129. Constitutional challenges to enhanced sentences
under recidivist statutes still are subject to proportionality review on a case-by-case basis. See gener-
ally Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. 110 (1976) (citations).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 77-94.
188. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3; id at 376-77 (Powell, J., concurring).
1985]
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tice Brennan's vigorous dissent helped to force that point.189 Second, even if
it survives, the narrowest of the three holdings, Rummel, expressly assured
some role for proportionality analysis in nonrecidivist situations. 190 Third,
the heightened state interest in punishing habitual offenders is not present by
definition so there is less reason for deference towards ordinary sentences for
terms of years. Fourth, interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional compari-
sons are simplified and clarified by eliminating the recidivism factor. Fifth,
and most likely controlling, the Helm holding and opinion supports the ex-
tension we urge. The general effort of the Helm majority opinion was to
establish an all-encompassing analysis.191 The framers' logic of extending
proportionality analysis from fines, at one extreme, to capital punishment, at
the other extreme, necessarily includes both life imprisonment and terms of
years in between.192 The Court's own discussion eschewed line-drawing be-
yond the threshold of imprisonment. 193 The Court expressly committed us
to a case-by-case approach to proportionality challenges.194  Indeed,
although the results in Rummel and Helm were inapposite, the analysis was
similar in this regard. The real difference was that a majority was convinced
of a constitutional violation only in Helm. Finally, the text, history, and
preceding case law also may be marshalled to dispel any notion that the life
sentence or recidivist factors alone should control. 195
189. 454 U.S. at 381, 381-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 377 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
190. 445 U.S. at 274 n.ll.
191. Note, supra note 74, at 694-95.
192. Beyond Weems, the Court has recognized that the eighth amendment imposes "parallel
limitations" on bail, fines, and other punishments. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
The trend in eighth amendment bail analysis is toward collapsing the capital-noncapital distinc-
tion. S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 691 (2d ed. 1984). In a case challenging
prison conditions, the Court observed "the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding
whether confinement meets constitutional standards." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978).
Most recently, in a death penalty decision the Court summarized the prohibition "against allpunish-
ments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the offenses
charged." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1983).
193. "There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sentences involving no
deprivation of liberty." 103 S. Ct. at 3012 n.18. But cf Government of the Virgin Is. v. Grant, No.
83/87, slip op. (D.V.I. May 31, 1984) (emphasizing rarity of a successful challenge on a term of
years).
The Rummel majority, in passing, had suggested a line at those offenses arguably classifiable as
felonies. 445 U.S. at 274. But see Dressier, supra note 9, at 1122-26 (narrowing and criticizing).
The Helm majority seems clearly to have rejected that approach. See supra text accompanying notes
103-110. Recall the later majority's discussion of other constitutional redoubts in cases concerning
the right to a speedy trial and the right to a jury trial. 103 S. Ct. at 3012. The Court's commitment
to a case-by-case approach answers the question.
This rendering follows another analogy, as well. The right to counsel once depended on a case-
by-case assessment into fundamental fairness. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Under that
approach, factors we reject were once deemed controlling of the right to counsel. Chewning v.
Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (recidivist conviction); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)
(capital crime); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) (habitual criminal conviction). The line finally
drawn, of course, was at any loss of liberty, the same line urged here for the proportionality doctrine.
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
194. 103 S. Ct. at 3012.
195. Dressier, supra note 9, at 1124-25. See also Note, Is Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Analysis Applicable to Mere Length of Sentence, 4 W. N. ENG. L. REv. 335 (1981).
Textually, the prohibition on excessive bails, fines and punishments is absolute in application,
qualified only by the evil of disproportionality. See supra note 192. See also Solem v. Helm, 103 S.
Ct. at 3006-3007; Gardner, supra note 45, at 1129.
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Additionally, consideration of the trilogy completes the scope of pro-
portionality review both temporally and fumctionally. While the pa-
role/non-parole distinction has some appeal on first impression, it cannot
control. Strictly limited to its facts, Helm, the only Supreme Court decision
declaring a criminal sentence disproportionate in length, involved a life sen-
tence without parole. Indeed, that factor played some role in the Court's
reasoning.196 Nevertheless, drawing a line between capital punishment and
life imprisonment without parole, on the one hand, and all the remaining
sentences with parole, on the other hand, would do violence to the eighth
amendment. The reasons given above for erasing the line between life
sentences and terms of years apply again. How could the same Court that
decided Helm defend a refusal to apply proportionality analysis to a life sen-
tence with the possibility of parole? Rummel's reservation of some propor-
tionality role would prevent such an outrageous result.197 Davis, in which
the same reservation was repeated, involved a term of years with the possi-
bility of parole. It must be beyond even the Supreme Court's ability to dis-
tinguish such precedents and to decide somehow that a greater sentence of a
term of years without the possibility of parole is beyond constitutional
inquiry.
The threshold must be loss of liberty. 198 The term of years/life sen-
tence distinction, the recidivist/non-recidivist distinction, the parole/non-
parole distinction are all important considerations in the analysis, none of
which alone are controlling. That a sentence is within such legislative limits,
however, cannot determine ipso facto that the sentence is constitutional. 199
The objective analysis set out in Helm will determine that issue. The review-
ing court must begin and end the inquiry with the three factors: (1) a com-
parison of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) a
comparison of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) a comparison with sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions. 20° The inexorable logic of case-by-case adjudication obliges
proportionality review of all sentences, although "extended" or in-depth
analysis is to be reserved for the rare evaluation in favor of the defendant.
20
'
This approach raises some concerns, some real and others fanciful. Sep-
aration of powers, federalism, and judicial restraint have become a standard
litany for our article III courts. These concepts provide us with the means
196. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07. Perhaps as significant, the Helm Court did not
adopt the Eighth Circuit's narrower approach regarding parole. Note, supra note 74, at 695 n.144;
Note, 36 ARK. L. REv., supra note 93, at 684-85; Annot. 27 A.L.R. FED. 110 (1976) (collecting
cases). Still, some courts have viewed the ineligibility for parole as critical. See Minor v. State, 451
So. 2d 433 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); King v. State, 451 So. 2d 765 (Miss. 1984); State v. Dillon, 349
N.W.2d 55 (S.D. 1984).
197. Even commentators hostile to proportionality analysis agree. See Schwartz, supra note 10,
at 419.
198. See supra note 190. Cf also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Constitution
protects against loss of liberty).
199. Comment, supra note 53, at 663-64.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 103-110.
201. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009 n.16. See also United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508
(11th Cir. 1984); Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1984); Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2353 (1984).
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to demarcate the proper place for the proportionality principle and the de-
ciding court.
C. Separation of Powers
In criminal law, we must begin with legislative power and executive
discretion under the doctrine of separation of powers. Of course, the legisla-
ture has the power to define conduct as crime and to provide punishments.
And, of course, the prosecutor has discretion to decide when and What
charges should be brought. Were there no eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments, the analysis would end there. However, a constitutional precept of
our justice holds that punishment must be proportionate to the severity of
the crime. Justice Brennan used the cruel and unusual punishments clause
to trump the absolute separation of powers ploy: "Judicial enforcement of
the Clause, then, cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legis-
latures have the power to prescribe punishments for crimes. That is pre-
cisely the reason the Clause appears in the Bill of Rights. ' '20 2 The
Constitution does not rely solely upon the executive and legislative depart-
ments.203 Instead, the judiciary, the third branch, as arbiter of the Constitu-
tion, has the duty to provide a remedy for executive and legislative
excesses. 204 The opposite approach would be fundamentally wrong. Indi-
vidual liberty is not purely an executive and legislative prerogative.205 Fur-
thermore, when a federal appellate court reviews a federal conviction and
sentence or when a state appellate court performs that function within the
state system, the judicial hierarchy is merely supervising the lower courts in
the exercise of their discretion and separation of powers is not indicated at
all. The allegation is that a legitimate judicial process, "as applied," has
yielded an invalid result. The appellate court has an affirmative duty to right
the wrong and the other branches of government should not be burdened
with a judicial responsibility to impose a proportionate sentence. 206 Indeed,
when the legislature, state or federal, delegates to the judiciary, state or fed-
202. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
203. Commenting on the federal legislative power to define crime and set punishments at the
Virginia convention, Patrick Henry urged: "But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to
be left, nor dependence put on the virtue of representatives." 3 J. ELLIOT'S DEBATES 447 (2d ed.
1876). Constitutional limits on legislative and executive prerogatives in criminal law are the ac-
cepted norm. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (unconstitutionally broad discretion);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminalization of status of addiction); Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448 (1962) (allegation of discriminatory prosecution). Cf also United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 438-43 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, some of these other limits have the
same impact as a proportionality principle. Review of charging decisions of prosecutors is most
similar. Cf Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
204. The right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, like the other guarantees of the
Bill of Rights "may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elec-
tions." "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and offi-
cials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
205. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 274.
Of course, the legislature is deserving of respect in the eighth amendment analysis. United
States v. McMahan, 744 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Hankins, 141 Ariz. 217, 686 P.2d 740(1984); Howard v. State, 467 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1984); State v. Shields, 454 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 1984).
206. State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 500 (S.D. 1980). ("It is incumbent upon this court to
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eral, the authority to choose from a wide range of sentences, the legislature
should be entitled to expect the choice will be reasonable and the sentence
proportionate to the crime.20 7 By contrast, when a federal court reviews a
state conviction and sentence, the constitutional concern for separated pow-
ers shifts to concern for principles of federalism.208
D. Federalism
Federalism may "mean all things to all people."2 09 What we mean by it
here is the proper respect by the federal courts for the sovereign states' pri-
mary role in enforcing the law of crimes. If the eighth and fourteenth
amendments prohibit state governments from inflicting cruel and unusual
punishments, then the event of incorporation alone should afford enough
respect. 210 Even after a state court has reviewed the matter, a positive con-
cept of federalism is served by the second look by the article III court.211
Proportionality review need not eliminate state experimentation with pun-
ishment schemes.2 12 The objective indicia from Helm allay the concern that
the federal judiciary will become a roving parole board. Comparison with
determine the propriety of such a sentence at this juncture; another branch of government should
not be burdened with rectifying this injustice.")
A state appellate court could proceed alternatively under the aegis of a state constitutional
provision wholly independent of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. See Note, Rummel v. Es-
telle: Sentencing Without a Rationale Basis, 32 SYRACUSE L. REv. 803, 828-30 (1981).
207. Note, supra note 8, at 1165.
208. Separated powers is a concept of respect between coordinate political branches. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Professor Thayer noted the same adjustment discussed in this Article:
But when the question is whether State action be or not be conformable to the paramount
constitution, the supreme law of the land, we have a different matter in hand. Fundamen-
tally, it involves the allotment of power between the two governments,-where the line is
to be drawn. True, the judiciary is still debating whether a legislature has transgressed its
limit; but the departments are not co-ordinate and the limit is at a different point. The
judiciary now speaks as representing a paramount constitution and government, whose
duty it is, in all its departments, to allow that constitution nothing less than its just and
true interpretation; and having fixed this, to guard it against any inroads from without.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of The American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. Rsv.
129, 154-55 (1893).
209. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy Requirement: A Proposal to
"Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 317 (1984). Outside the legal community,
editorials appeared in the Washington Star ("When punishment is as out of proportion as it was
here, the danger.. . . is that law, not to mention federalism, will be made contemptible."), the New
York Times ("Would any sentence be so out of line as to violate the Court's sense of decency?"), and
The Nation ("One would have thought that preventing such cruel aberrations is just what the
Supreme Court and the Eighth Amendment were created to do."), which were critical of the Rum-
mel decision. Comment, 19 DuQ. L. REv. 167, 178-79 n.86 (1980) (quotations). This is some indi-
cation of what federalism means to some people.
210. See supra note I.
The argument that there somehow is a tenth amendment state power to violate the eighth and
fourteenth amendment cannot be taken seriously. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 661-62 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc).
211. Justice Brennan has observed:
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard individual rights,
the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal judiciary. But in
so doing, it has forgotten that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a
double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism is not served when
the federal half of that protection is crippled.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 502-03
(1977) (footnotes omitted).
212. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 618-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction obviously defers
to the particular state's legislative scheme and the state judiciary's primary
role in implementation. Comparison with sentences for the same crime in
other jurisdictions achieves a federalizing influence. Both intrajurisdictional
and extrajurisdictional comparisons circumscribe federal judicial subjectivity
by relying on objective data from the state legislatures. These two factors
place a premium on deference to the state legislature. The third factor, a
comparison between the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-
alty, is not so much subjective as it is relative and judicial. Certainly, the
initial sentencing of a convicted defendant is not so subjective as to be be-
yond the judicial ken. Nor should be the proportionality review. The Helm
court was mindful of federalism: "The inherent nature of our federal system
and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of
constitutional sentences. Thus no single criterion can identify when a sen-
tence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. '213  This accommodation affords sufficient respect for state
sovereignty; proportionality review requires sufficient respect for human dig-
nity.214 Many state courts215 and some federal courts216 had employed the
objective criteria before the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur with no un-
toward effect on federalism. In the vast majority of cases, the proportional-
ity review will be cursory and the sentence will be affirmed as constitutional.
Rarely will the court engage in extended analysis 217 and rarer still will be the
successful claim. 218 Finally, the degree of interference is lessened. A suc-
cessful proportionality challenge does not free the defendant or make retrial
impossible, but only obliges the state to re-sentence within broad constitu-
tional proportions. In matters of federalism, "[ilt is always a doubtful
course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility
of its abuse."'219
213. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010 n.17. See also Dressier, supra note 9, at 1114-16.
214. For most crimes, experience is commonplace and legislative response has been relatively
uniform. After all, 38 states have adopted the same model criminal code. In some complex areas of
criminal law policy, however, diversity is more likely. For example, a particular jurisdiction may
single out drug or sex crimes for particularly harsh sanctions. Justifications for variation do exist
and, most assuredly, the objective criteria will admit such legitimate disparity. See generally Note,
supra note 8, at 1141-50. !Eg., United States v. Greer, 739 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding state
statute imposing extended sentence for "exceptionally brutal or heinous behaviour indicative of wan-
ton cruelty.")
215. That state courts previously have utilized the technique goes far to answer the federalism
concern. See Schwartz, supra note-10, at 396-401 (California, Kentucky, Michigan, South Carolina).
See generally Comment, 1976 Was. L. REv. 584, 664-67; Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1976) (citations).
216. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 401-06 (Second, Fourth and Sixth Circuits). The Fourth
Circuit's experience convinced Justice Powell that "federal courts are capable of applying the Eighth
Amendment to disproportionate noncapital sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to principles
of federalism and state autonomy." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 306 (Powell, J., dissenting). The
Fourth Circuit adopted a proportionality analysis in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). Under that approach only two noncapital sentences were voided.
Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979); Robert v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976). All
other challenges were rejected. E.g., Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Griffin v.
Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1975).
217. "In view of the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing
courts, a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a
sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate." Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3009 n.16.
218. Id at 3009 ("exceedingly rare"), (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272).
219. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816).
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E. Judicial Restraint
Judicial restraint provides one last vantage on the Rummel-Davis-Helm
trilogy.220 The Court's approach may be explained by considering the path
taken and the philosophy of text and institution. This twin sense of role
provides a new perspective on the proportionality principle which we call the
"ratchett theory." Where our theory leads, however, is an issue on which
we coauthors disagree. Our eighth amendment disagreement is encom-
passed within the recent debate over the larger issue of judicial review. This
Article, however, is confined to the philosophy of proportionality.
1. Coauthor Consensus
The Court certainly was prophetic in 1878 when it observed, "Difficulty
would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitu-
tional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall
not be inflicted. '221 The particular dilemma facing the Court in the propor-
tionality analysis is whether the principle is merely a euphemism or whether
the principle bestows on the Court a responsibility to create a rational, co-
herent structure of sentencing and an obligation to reconcile each sentence
with the created system.222 As it has done when faced with most dilemmas,
the Court has attempted to steer a middle course. Far from being a simple
compromise, the Court's resolution is a classic statement of role and follows
the superior philosophy of the eighth amendment text.223
The proportionality principle has long been a component of the eighth
amendment protection. The difficulty greater than creation has been divin-
ing content. One reason for the principle's periods of desuetude has been the
lack of a coherent framework for analyzing proportionality issues. The
Court in Rummel and Davis did not supply that framework. The Helm
Court took the necessary next step. Rummel and Davis represent one choice
of analysis and one philosophy of the principle. Helm represents the other.
For the Rummel and Davis controlling positions, the proportionality princi-
ple was an ill-defined attitude that engaged, if at all, only the most extreme
sentence imaginable-"if a legislature made overtime parking a felony pun-
ishable by life imprisonment. '224 Such a proportionality principle smacks of
the old, discredited "shocks the conscience" approach to constitutional
law.225 The flaws are obvious. Far from being less subjective, the due pro-
220. To the reader who asks what sentences we would uphold in the three cases we discuss, our
answer may be unsatisfactory but is a truthful "We do not know." The federal interest is satisfied by
striking the disproportionate sentence and remanding to the state for reconsideration. Commenta-
tors should be able to get away with what the Court does. See generally Posner, The Meaning of
Judicial Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983).
221. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
222. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. RaV. 1071, 1071 (1964).
223. See Gardner, supra note 45, at 1103, 1105; Note, supra note 203, at 825. See generally M.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENcEs 7-8, 23-24, 105-111 (1973).
We resist the temptation to take the infinite regression into theories of judicial review. Recon-
ciling the eighth amendment thesis of this Article with recent writings on the more general subject of
judicial review is beyond the scope of this Article.
224. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11.
225. See Rogers v. United States, 304 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1962) ("completely arbitrary and
shocking to the sense of justice"); Mitchell v. State, 563 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Mo. 1978) ("so dispropor-
1985]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
cess test allows the Justices to make purely personal decisions appealing to
their own personal jurisprudence. The Rummel-Davis orientation was quite
clear. Davis may be seen as embracing a philosophy that equated "rare"
with "never" as in "'successful challenges to the proportionality of particu-
lar sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare.' "226 This approach turns the
concept of constitutional rights on its head; constitutional rights cannot de-
pend on majority sentiment to be meaningful. Most importantly, the Rum-
mel-Davis philosophy defers to the legislature completely on the question of
sentencing, and is therefore at odds with the text, history and precedent of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause. In effect, the now discarded ap-
proach could have collapsed the "facial"/"as applied" distinction and pre-
dictably would have upheld all sentences within legislative maxima as ipso
facto valid. The Court thus would have abdicated its constitutional
responsibility.
Instead, the Helm majority took a tack between that extreme position
and an equally unsatisfactory opposite. Still rejecting a role that would
fabricate a constitutionally required sentencing scheme and measure each
sentence against the hypothetical ideal,227 the Helm Court pulled back from
the Rummel-Davis abdication. The objective test rebuffed in Rummel-Davis
and embraced in Helm represents an important refinement of the propor-
tionality doctrine. The doctrinal adjustment in Helm may be seen best by
distinguishing two recent death penalty decisions.228 In Coker v. Georgia229
and in Enmund v. Florida,230 the Court applied a two-step analysis to hold
that the death penalty was disproportionate for the nonaggravated rape of an
adult woman (Coker) and for murder by an aider and abettor who did not
actually intend or attempt to take a life (Enmund). First, the Court consid-
ered objective indicia of proportionality history, legislative judgments, sen-
tencing judgments of juries, and even international opinion.23 1 Second, the
Court assessed for itself the proportion between offense and penalty.23 2
Most importantly, the Court said that the more subjective factor, the pro-
portion between offense and penalty, controlled the issue.233
Contrast the Coker-Enmund approach and results with Helm.234 The
same data was considered. Intrajurisdictional comparisons with sentences
tionate to the offense committed so as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men"). The "shock
the conscience" cliche may be traced through Justice Frankfurter back to Justice Holmes, who
stripped away euphemisms to affirm convictions unless what the government did made him sick. See
B. SCHWARTZ, SUPERCHIEF 34 (1983). Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
226. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 454 U.S. at 272) (emphasis
added).
227. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), held that the eighth amendment does not require
proportionality review by an appellate court in every death sentence case in which the defendant so
requests. The proportionality review we discuss was carefully distinguished. Id. at 875.
228. See generally Comment, supra note 148, at 1383-85.
229. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality).
230. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
231. Id. at 786-90; 433 U.S. at 592-97.
232. 458 U.S. at 790-93; 433 U.S. at 597-98.
233. 458 U.S. at 790 ("[lit is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty .... "); 433 U.S. at 597 ("[Tlhe Constitution contemplates that in
the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question .
234. See supra text accompanying notes 103-110.
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for other crimes and interjurisdictional comparisons with sentences for the
same crime, the second and third Helm factors, were derived from the death
penalty analysis.235 The first factor in Helm, a comparison of the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty, was also taken from the death
cases but with two significant refinements. By the legerdemain of constitu-
tional stare decisis, the Rummel-Davis requirement for objectivity was satis-
fied by labelling the comparison "objective." 236 Additionally, the factor was
demoted from being controlling in the death cases to simply one of three
factors in the imprisonment cases.237
Philosophy becomes central in this discussion. There is a meaningful
distinction between interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional external-objec-
tive comparisons, on the one hand, and the introspective crime-punishment
comparison, on the other. Comparing the sentence imposed with other
crime sentences in the same jurisdiction and with same crime sentences in
other jurisdictions is a positivistic approach to the issue. The concern for
equal treatment is pursued by deferring to other institutional deci-
sionmakers, legislatures, trial courts, and juries. Without more, however,
the approach is sterile at best and circular at worst. 238 Human dignity goes
beyond statistical study and the Justices must be more than statisticians.
Furthermore, the approach meets itself in every case in which the sentence is
within legislative limits. In contrast, the first factor, the introspective com-
parison of crime and punishment, is ultimately normative. "Ultimately, pro-
portionality comes down to a comparison of the personal and social interests
invaded by the criminal with the personal and social interests invaded by the
punishment. '239 This factor plumbs the depths of evolving standards of
human decency and of the institutional role of the Court.
Concerns for human dignity are on both sides of the comparison, the
crime suffered by the victim and the punishment imposed on the perpetrator.
This weighing and balancing necessarily involves the Court in measuring
evolving standards of human decency. In effect, the Court is obliged to in-
terpret text with social morality in a contextual application of "social
text.,,240
On this level, the failure of the Rummel-Davis approach and the inevita-
bility of Helm is better understood. The Rummel-Davis demand for com-
plete objectivity cannot be satisfied, at least not to the satisfaction of the
Rummel and Davis pluralities. So be it. The eighth amendment is designed
to preserve human dignity, not objective science. The philosophy is human-
235. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3008 (citing Enmund and Coker).
236. Id. at 3010-11.
Realistically viewed, proportioning the crime and punishment certainly is no less objective than
eighth amendment decisions involving the mode of punishment in executions by injection, gaseous
asphyxiation, shooting, and hanging. See generally L. BERKSON, supra note 10, at 21-31.
237. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3010 n.17.
Whether Helm signals a deemphasis of this factor in death cases or whether the wholistic ap-
proach is limited to imprisonment cases or even, most narrowly, life imprisonment without parole
cases is unclear. See Comment, supra note 146, at 1384. See also Note, supra note 8, at 1122.
238. Radin, supra note 45, at 1057-60.
239. Id. at 1060.
240. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765, 767, 769 (1982).
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istic not formalistic. 241 The prevailing philosophy, indeed the framers' phi-
losophy and the only consistent philosophy, has emphasized the
evolutionary nature of the amendment. 242 The "evolving concept of human
decency" is the benchmark, the dignity of man the goal. The concept may
be likened to a ratchet. As civilization makes progress in respecting the per-
sonhood of individuals, the scope of the eighth amendment protection in-
creases. The social text expands the eighth amendment text in fits and
surges but in one certain direction. Once the ratchet has turned, it cannot be
allowed to click back.243 Once the text has been developed, it cannot be
allowed to slip back to a lesser level of protection for the Constitution defines
a social minimum. 244 Once the community's morality has condemned a
punishment and that condemnation has been incorporated into the constitu-
tional morality, there is no going back.245 Is it even arguable that a Gallup
poll could permit a return to drawing and quartering? The intent and his-
tory of the eighth amendment obliges a one-directional evolution; only
reamendment may change this feature. This holds for methods of discern-
ment as well as for units of progress. Hence, Rummel and Davis were
wrongly decided. They are aberrations in the constitutional evolution.
Prior, accepted decisions had recognized and applied the proportionality
principle. The principle had been read into the eighth amendment text. The
ratchet could not be turned back, at least not constitutionally without
amendment. 246 Social text cannot be overruled by the Court.247 Helm cor-
rectly applied the eighth amendment ratchet.
241. Dressier, supra note 9, at 1082; Packer, supra note 221, at 1076.
242. See generally Note, supra note 9.
243. The ratchet does not depend on a liberal versus conservative orientation nor on an active
versus passive judicial philosophy. See Posner, supra note 220, at 19-20.
244. Analogies come to mind. In the general matter of individual rights, the state supreme
courts may not go below the constitutional minima set by the United States Supreme Court, but can
go farther in affording protection under a state constitution. J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-21 (2d ed. 1983). Congress, under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, seems empowered to expand the law of equal protection but not to contract it. See Cox, The
Role of Congress in Constitutional Determination, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 253 (1971).
245. See R. DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTs SERiOuSLY 106-07, 126 (1977).
246. Cf Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (declaring the earlier precedent of
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), unconstitutional).
247. Professor Hart's famous dialogue contains our thesis:
Q. But that is what the Court has held. And so I guess that's that.
A. No, it isn't.
The deepest assumptions of the legal order require that the decisions of the highest
court in the land be accepted as settling the rights and wrongs of the particular matter
immediately in controversy. But the judges who sit for the time being on the court have no
authority to remake by fiat alone the fabric of principle by which future cases are to be
decided. They are only the custodians of the law and not the owners of it. The law belongs
to the people of the country, and to the hundreds of thousands of lawyers and judges who
through the years have struggled, in their behalf, to make it coherent and intelligible and
responsive to the people's sense of justice.
And so when justices of the Supreme Court sit down and write opinions in behalf of
the Court which ignore the painful forward steps of a whole half century of adjudication,
making no effort to relate what then is being done to what the Court has done before, they
write without authority for the future. The appeal to principle is still open and, so long as
courts of the United States sit with general jurisdiction in habeas corpus, that means an
appeal to them and their successors.
Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. Rv. 1362, 1395-96 (1953).
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The ratchet theory exposes an important issue involving the underlying
role of the eighth amendment. Giving normative content to the proportion-
ality analysis creates an ambiguity. The ambiguity is deep enough to divide
the coauthors. "Few minds are accustomed to the same habit of thinking,
and our conclusions are most satisfactory to ourselves, when arrived at in
our own way."248 Our division, in turn, highlights an underlying tension in
eighth amendment theory.
2. Coauthor Baldwin Concurring
For two hundred years, this nation has glorified one text as central.
Indeed, the Constitution is more theological than legal. 249 It is heretical for
the present Court to be unaware, or unwilling to admit that its judgments
have moral force, to pretend that it is only "a court" and not an institution
steeped in political, moral, and ethical values.250 Despite some of the cur-
rent members' protestations to the contrary, the Supreme Court is not an
ordinary court, it is unique. With this powerful role comes responsibility.
The Court must understand its own nature to deal with the folly of both
coordinate branches and state sovereigns. Self-discipline requires that the
Court strip away verbiage to discover the first principles which have nur-
tured the almost mystical respect for the Court and the Constitution. The
Court must exhibit the courage to uphold its role as a counter-institutional
check upon the majority and even the political process itself. Much is at
stake. During the present period of transition, the balance between govern-
ment and the individual shows signs of being weighted in favor of the gov-
ernment.251 Under the Constitution, however, the Court is obliged to place
its thumb on the scale. Fealty to that document will not allow de-emphasis
of the principles of personhood. The Rummel-Davis-Helm trilogy, while ul-
timately resisting the threatening devaluation, does so somewhat ineptly.
Visceral subjectivity of the sitting Justices is no better than the persons in-
volved. More must be expected. I expect more. The Helm asymptotes of
objectivity are inevitably value-laden. Yet, that admission is their virtue and
not, as the dissent there would have it, their vice. The three criteria are not a
pretense of absolute objectivity, but rather represent an effort to gauge tangi-
ble reflection of the common mind, the Jungian sense of justice. They are
the present culmination of historically rich principles and valid constitu-
tional concerns. The three-year struggle with Rummel to fix absolutes was
the aberration, the lapse in institutional courage; Helm was the needed re-
turn. Nor should the three Helm criteria be viewed as hubris. The compara-
tive law approach and the Court's role in the proportionality principle are
venerable propositions of constitutional law.
Majority opinion alone cannot be determinative. While public opinion
may be relevant, it cannot be conclusive in assessing whether a particular
sentence is consonant with contemporary standards. What society actually
248. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 362 (1816) (Johnson, J., concurring).
249. A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALTY 3 (1978).
250. See generally A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982).
251. See generally T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1967).
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does is a more compelling indicator. The Helm factors recognize this by
taking into account intrajurisdictional other-crime sentences and extrajuris-
dictional same-crime sentences. 252 Yet there is more to the judicial role.
Reflection of contemporary morality is not moral leadership. An eighth
amendment commitment to moral evolution calls for such leadership from
the Court.253 The Helm Court may be faulted for not going further, for not
turning the ratchet. Whether a sentence is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime is but one dimension of the constitutional value. Ulti-
mately and logically the proportionality analysis must extend the portion of
the death penalty analysis least recognized and most controversial. The
Court eventually must admit and exercise the power to declare a punishment
excessive and unconstitutional if it "makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purpose-
less and needless imposition of pain and suffering. ' 254 That issue was
briefed and avoided in Rummel2 "5 and ignored in Helm.256 I recognize that
this second prong of eighth amendment analysis had not yet been the basis of
a Supreme Court holding.257 If evolving standards of decency are foreseeable
and articulable, then the Supreme Court has a moral duty to articulate them
and incorporate them into the body politic. This then, is the challenge fac-
ing the Court, to fullfil its sacred trust with ourselves and our posterity.
3. Coauthor Baker Concurring
Coauthor Baldwin's approach goes too far. Accepting the two Weems
corollaries of first, subordination of the judiciary to the legislature and, sec-
ond, interpretive constitutional supremacy in the Supreme Court, I believe
that the institutional role of the Court must remain in the present. Of
course, the Court's role goes beyond fitting theory and rules. The Court is
obliged to exercise the normative philosophy of society-but not its own.
The distinction is crucial. The Court is the only institution capable of devel-
oping a theory of the Constitution by referring to political philosophy and
institutional detail.258 These external referrents control the Court's own
predilections and predictions. Any theory of the Constitution must be true
to society's concept of human dignity.259 I remain convinced that the Court
must measure human dignity as it is objectively reflected at present. Two
reasons explain why. First, prediction is fraught with problems; the future is
uncertain and may be misread. Second, tomorrow's decency is just as out of
touch with today's society as was yesterday's decency. "[A] 'liberal acceler-
ator' is neither less nor more consistent with democratic theory than a 'con-
252. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently followed this logic to conclude the
death penalty violated the state constitutional protection against crime and unusual punishments.
District Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980).
253. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 98-99 (1982).
254. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). See supra note 8.
255. Dressier, supra note 9, at 1096-97.
256. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
257. But cf Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 625-26 (1978).
258. R. DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106-07 (1977).
259. IML at 134.
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servative brake.' ,,260 Human decency, if it is to have any philosophic roots,
must be rooted in prevailing democratic philosophy respecting the per-
sonhood of the individual. The Court serves as guardian of the Constitution
not as a convention.
Of course, the first step in the analysis, comparing the gravity of the
offense with the severity of the punishment, will call for application of the
Court's own judgment. That application, however, must be informed by
careful study and the second and third factors, the interjurisdictional other
crime comparison and the extrajurisdictional same crime comparison, must
be complementary.2 61 While no one factor controls, the factors taken to-
gether must yield an obvious conclusion to be legitimate. While it is difficult
to know how far the Court should go, at least one approach can be identified
that does not go far enough. Justice Rehnquist, author of Rummel and dis-
senter in Helm, once explained his viewpoint in a death penalty decision:
[A]n error in mistakenly sustaining the constitutionality of a particular
enactment, while wrongfully depriving the individual of a right se-
cured to him by the Constitution, nonetheless does so by simply letting
stand a duly enacted law of a democratically chosen legislative body.
The error resulting from a mistaken upholding of an individual's con-
stitutional claim against the validity of a legislative enactment is a
good deal more serious. For the result in such a case is not to leave
standing a law duly enacted by a representative assembly, but to im-
pose upon the Nation the judicial fiat of a majority of a court of judges
whose connection with the popular will is remote at best.
262
This could not be more wrong in its incompleteness. The potential harm
from judicial abdication is most serious under our Constitution:
The risks from court abdication are great. An error by the judici-
ary in favor of a defendant and against legislature action adds to the
right of individuals while denying legislature flexibility. This error
seems preferable to the [Justice Rehnquist] alternative: leaving the en-
forcement of the principle of personhood to the good faith and abilities
of legislature bodies. The violation of individual rights that would re-
sult from a legislative error in the application of that precept of justice
is more serious than any loss of legislative flexibility that would be
sacrificed by allowing judicial oversight.263
Judicial review inevitably involves a conflict between judicial and legislative
interpretation; the eighth amendment is no different.26 Nevertheless, there
should be some judicial restraint. More can be made out of the text than my
260. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 70 (1980).
261. See infra note 330.
262. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 468 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263. Dressier, supra note 9, at 1102-03.
264. Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and legislative
judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect, Eighth Amend-
ment cases come to us in no different posture. It seems conceded by all that the Amend-
ment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of
punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment would bar whether legis-
latively approved or not.




coauthor allows. For example, the judicial review power is narrowed only to
those punishments that are either too serious ("cruel") or too capricious
("unusual").2 65 The judiciary must apply these limits, but must be aware of
them in that application.266 The principle of proportionality is constitution-
ally mandated, but not boundless. A corollary principle within the objective
Helm analysis is the strong presumption of validity since "the constitutional
test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the
legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. '267 Co-
author Baldwin pays this only lip service. While a successful proportionality
challenge will be something of a rara avis, that reality does not lessen the
necessity of the particular category of judicial review. The sentence "must
not only be rational, but decent. '268 The Court cannot shirk its responsibil-
ity, as it tried to in Rummel. The Helm analysis reasserted the proper judi-
cial role.269 The inherent difficulty in line drawing does not excuse the
Court from its responsibility.270
Still, a harsh punishment should be declared unconstitutional only if the
Court is confident that the great majority of society would find it unaccept-
able for the crime committed and not because of some accounting compari-
son. It is not necessary to go the next step, as coauthor Baldwin does, and
gaze into the crystal ball. The text, history, and precedents of the eighth
amendment do not go so far. My coauthor leaves them and me far behind-
in the present. Nor does constitutional common sense call for his radical
approach. First, it betrays reality to believe that any sentence authorized by
a legislature and imposed by a judge would "mak[e] no measurable contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment. '271 Modem punishment theory is a
melange of retribution, deterrence, denunciation, incapacitation, and reha-
bilitation. 272 Every sentence is prima facie beyond challenge from the Kant-
ian notion that "one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means
subservient to the purposes of another. ' 273 As an absolute, then, this pre-
cept is devoid of content. Besides, I believe that constitutional law does best
265. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT 14 (1981).
266. Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a
democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable,
within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence.
History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing be-
tween competing political, economic, and social pressures.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
267. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
268. Dressier, supra note 9, at 1113 n.387. "It is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
slould be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910).
269. By way of analogy, it is useful to recall how the Court attempted to extricate itself from
obscenity analysis, but later reluctantly performed its role. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973) with Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). See Mulligan, supra note 10, at 647-48.
270. Justice Powell criticized the Rummel plurality's approach on this score: "The Court has, in
my view, chosen the easiest line rather than the best." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 306, 306-07
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
271. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).
272. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 7-8, 23-24, 105-11 (1973).
273. I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1986 (Hastie trans. 1887). See H.L.A. HART, PUNISH-
MENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 243-44 (1968).
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to avoid substantive absolutes. The concern must be marginal, that is, the
benefit to penological goals is too small to justify the severity of the particu-
lar sentence. But that is the proportionality principle-the principle of per-
sonhood that prohibits a punishment more severe than that deserved.
Coauthor Baldwin's approach simply goes too far; during the journey
he crosses accepted boundaries of judicial review, separation of powers, fed-
eralism, and even democratic theory. It is one thing to base a disproportion-
ality holding on objective measures of marginal utility using contemporary
indicators. It is quite another to arrogate to a non-democratic elite the
power to shape the future course of human dignity. It is true that the social
text informs the written text, but the latter codifies a minimum, not a maxi-
mum, content of personhood. My coauthor's approach also violates princi-
ples of personhood and individual autonomy. Individual morality is for the
individual. Societal morality is for the society to determine. The Court has
gone as far as I would have it go in the Helm objective analysis. Coauthor
Baldwin's excess simply proves too much.2 74 The Supreme Court does serve
as conscience of the Constitution, but the Constitution should value and
honor the freedom of conscience of the individual and society, both now and
in the future. There is one important point for agreement: the ratchet
theory of the eighth amendment finally and conclusively demonstrates the
fundamental error of the Court in Rummel and Davis. Eighth amendment
analysis must not allow retrogression. Furthermore, the issue remaining
should force the Court to plumb the depths of the doctrine of judicial review.
The Helm analysis will vacillate until the Court recognizes and decides the
central divisive issue of role. To complete the task, however, esoteric con-
cerns must be put aside and analysis of precedent and application be
continued.
F. Judicial Reaction to the Trilogy
With each shift in proportionality philosophy, the Supreme Court
writes an epistle on social text for the entire judicial system. Reaction is
prompt and instructive.2 75 Lower federal court and state court response to
Helm confirm a few preliminary observations and suggest some techniques
for advocates and adjudicators alike. The stream of cases is not yet very
deep; elaboration and refinement have been tentative.2 76
274. Professor Ely does enough to shake my confidence in going as far as I do:
The notion that the genuine values of the people can most reliably be discerned by a
nondemocratic elite is sometimes referred to in the literature as "the Fuhrer principle,"
and indeed it was Adolph Hitler who said that "[m]y pride is that I know no statesman in
the world who with greater right than I can say he is the representative of his people." We
know, however, that this is not an attitude limited to rightwing elites. "The Soviet defini-
tion" of democracy, as H.B. Mayo has written, also involved the "ancient error" of assum-
ing that "the wishes of the people can be ascertained more accurately by some mysterious
methods of intuition open to an elite rather than by allowing people to discuss and vote and
decide freely."
Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 51 (1978) (footnotes
omitted). Why is it necessary to go the next step? My coauthor has not given any reason to do so.
275. For summaries of federal and state court reactions to Rummel, then seen as definitive, see
generally Dressier, supra note 9, at 1118 n.406; Note, supra note 75, at 497-501; Note, supra note 12,
at 129-30; Note, supra note 41, at 452-61; Note, supra note 206, at 828-32.
276. Certainly the "flood of cases" warned against by some has not materialized. Doomsayers
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Only a few federal court of appeals' decisions merit mention. 277 Not
surprisingly, there are two distinct approaches toward reconciling Rummel
and Helm. In Moreno v. Estelle,278 the Fifth Circuit took a literalist ap-
proach to the precedents.279 Jerry Carlo Moreno was convicted of aggra-
vated assault and sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas recidivist
statute. The court of appeals afflirmed the denial of federal relief in the na-
ture of habeas corpus, holding, among other things, that his sentence satis-
fied the proportionality principle.280 Evidencing some ambiguity, the court
of appeals applied Rummel which "still provides the rule in cases with fact
situations not clearly distinguishable. '281 Moreno had been sentenced under
the same Texas recidivist statute applied in Rumme1282 and was eligible for
parole. The only distinction, that under the Texas statutes Moreno would be
eligible for parole eight years later than Rummel, was negated by a simple
comparison of Moreno's more serious third felony (aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon) with Rummel's third felony (obtaining $120.75 by false pre-
tenses). Thinking itself bound by Rummel and unable to distinguish it, the
court of appeals refused to remand Moreno to the district court for a Helm
analysis even though the latter case was decided after the district court's
consideration. 28 3
failed to distinguish between plenary appellate review of sentences and an eighth amendment propor-
tionality analysis. Compare Schwartz, supra note 10, at 418-19 with H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 36 (1973).
It remains to be seen whether the federal judiciary will experience an overwhelming surge of
proportionality claims, although that seems unlikely. If the cases do come in waves, the federal
courts might try to follow the California lead and hold that attacks to indeterminate sentences are
premature until a release date is set. See People v. Wingo, 15 Cal. 3d 167, 534 P.2d 1001 (1975).
The Court's trilogy analysis, however, seems to deny this approach. The federal courts also might
try to screen proportionality appeals by extending Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to bar
federal petitions after a full and fair hearing in state court. Proportionality, unlike the exclusionary
rule, is of constitutional dimension, however, and such an extension would exceed that decision's
rationale. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
277. For example, on direct review in United States v. Rosandich, 729 F.2d 1512, 1512-13 (8th
Cir. 1984), the court summarily upheld a guilty plea and two-year sentence for conspiracy to commit
mail fraud. A one-year incarceration sentence with six one-year sentences consecutive and sus-
pended for home improvement trade practice violations under state law was approved on federal
habeas corpus review as "a far cry" from Helm. Stepniewski v. Gagnon, 732 F.2d 567, 571-72 n.3
(7th Cir. 1984).
The First Circuit affirmed a twelve year and $2500 fine sentence for possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance with only the assertion that it was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment. United States v. Francisco, 725 F.2d 817, 823 (1st Cir. 1984). Most uses of the Helm prece-
dent have been even less significant. See, ag., Smith v. Snow, 722 F.2d 630, 632 (11th Cir. 1983);
McClaskey v. United States Dept. of Energy, 720 F.2d 583, 591 (9th Cir. 1983) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting); Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1482 (9th Cir. 1983); Prejean v. Blackburn, 570 F.
Supp. 985, 998 (W.D. La. 1983).
278. 717 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 2353 (1984).
279. See supra notes 133-55 and accompanying text.
280. 717 F.2d at 179-81.
281. Id. at 180. The district court had denied relief based exclusively on Rummel. The court of
appeals observed, "[w]e are unable to reject the [proportionality] claim without consideration of the
principles modifying Rummel as enunciated by the Supreme Court decision in Solem v. Helm." Id.
at 179 (citation omitted). Later, the court mysteriously noted, "Of course, a determination of
whether a sentence is 'within constitutional-limits' will often require at least a perfunctory Solem
analysis." Id. at 180 n.10. Cf also Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1984).
282. See supra note 54.
283. 717 F.2d -at 181. Seemingly, much the same approach was taken by the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Zylstra, 713 F.2d 1332, 1341 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 U.S. 403 (1983).
[Vol. 27
CHALLENGES TO LENGTH OF CRIMINAL SENTENCE
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit seems to have adopted the realistic
view of the precedents suggested earlier.284 In Seritt v. Alabama,285 the dis-
trict court denied federal habeas corpus relief to Harlin Phillip Seritt,
mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under the Ala-
bama habitual felony offender statute. Seritt had been convicted of four sep-
arate offenses in 1975 and one in 1973 under the state controlled substances
act. Armed robbery was the triggering offense for the habitual sentence.
Citing Rummel, the court of appeals upheld the facial constitutionality of
the nonparolable recidivist statute.286 The court of appeals then concluded
that Helm alone was completely dispositive of the "as applied" proportional-
ity issue.287 Evaluation of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty satisfied the first objective criteria. Alabama had created a complex
grading of the recidivist sanction for persons like Seritt who had been con-
victed at least three times previously of very serious offenses and who then
committed a serious and violent crime which threatened life. Considering
the first objective factor, both blameworthiness and punishment were of the
most severe type. The second objective factor, comparison of intrajurisdic-
tional sentences, also moved the court towards affirmance. Focusing on the
intricacies of the Alabama legislature's framework, the court recognized a
complex three-tiered recidivist hierarchy in which the least serious offenses
triggered a discretionary life sentence with the possibility of parole, more
serious offenses triggered a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of
parole, and the most serious offenses of a life threatening variety triggered a
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole. The Constitution
was satisfied by Alabama's careful discrimination among categories of recidi-
vists. The third objective factor left the court unsure. Assuming that Seritt
had the burden of showing interjurisdictional disproportionality, the court
tried to apply the sentencing provisions in Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, and
Tennessee to his criminal record.288 Although neither Georgia nor Missis-
sippi have habitual-offender statutes, both states authorize life imprisonment
for Seritt's trigger offense of armed robbery. Florida has the same author-
ized sentence plus an habitual-offender statute which has a particular re-
quirement for the timing of prior bffenses, as did Tennessee, which was not
clearly indicated in the record before the court. The court of appeals was
not convinced that Seritt would not have received an enhanced sentence in
those two states. Because it was "not clear" that the Alabama sentence was
more harsh than the sentences which would have been imposed in the other
states, the court was "not left with a firm conviction that Seritt's sentence
284. See supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
285. 731 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1984).
286. Ma2 at 730-31 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
287. 731 F.2d at 731-32 (citing Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983)). In what appears to have
been a lapse into wooden factual comparisons, the court of appeals distinguished Helm by arbitrarily
narrowing that holding to a one sentence proposition: "'Ihe Eighth Amendment proscribes a life
sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony." 731 F.2d at 732 (quoting
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3004 (emphasis by court of appeals)). Since Seritt's trigger felony was
violent, his was factually distinguishable. Id. Fortunately, the court of appeals did not stop there.
288. The court of appeals did not explain why these states were chosen or why other states'
statutes were not considered.
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[was] disproportionate to his crime. ' 289 The eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments were satisfied, at least in the Eleventh Circuit. The federal courts
have favored the Eleventh Circuit's approach over that of the Fifth
Circuit.290
Post-Helm state court developments may be summarized similarly.291
While courts in many states have considered the proportionality principle,
they have divided along the same line as the literalist view of the Fifth Cir-
cuit and more realistic view of the Eleventh Circuit. One group of decisions
takes the literalist approach to the proportionality precedential trilogy;
Rummel, Davis, and Helm are deemed coequal holdings.292 A second group
of decisions, which seems to predominate, follows the more realistic ap-
proach and uses the Helm objective criteria exclusively.293 The state experi-
ence demonstrates the rarity of a successful proportionality challenge.294
Thus, it appears that a court may approach a proportionality issue prin-
ciple from either the Rummel or the Helm perspective. This subtle conflict
underscores the importance of the advocate's sophistication and facility with
the precedents and the courts' sophistication in the analysis.
G. Application of the Extended Analysis
To get beyond conclusory invocations of disproportionality, an attorney
or a court must carefully reflect on the three Helm factors. As with most
289. Id. at 736.
290. For examples of decisions that have used the Eleventh Circuit's approach, see United States
v. Fishback & Moore, Inc., Slip op. No. 84-3242 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 1984); United States v. Ortiz, Slip
op. No. 84-1040 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 1984); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir. 1984);
Rhoden v. Israel, 574 F. Supp. 61, 65 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (upheld a 17-year sentence for armed robbery
on a first offender); Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 567 F. Supp. 1371, 1381-82 (D. Idaho 1983) (upheld
a minimum sentence of 11 years 8 months for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor).
291. Earlier state court cases, decided before Helm, are discussed in Note, supra note 42, at 458-
61. Holdings under related provisions in state constitutions are beyond the scope of our discussion.
See, e-g., People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3rd 441, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983); State v.
Weigel, 228 Kan. 195, 612 P.2d 636 (1980); State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980);
Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1981). Some state court decisions are at least
noteworthy because they have ignored the Supreme Court's recent efforts. State v. Watson, 686 P.2d
879 (Mont. 1984) (three consecutive 100-year terms without possibility of parole).
292. Florida: Williams v. State, 441 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1983). Kentucky:
Hampton v. Commonwealth, 66 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1984). Louisiana: State v. Lathers, 444 So. 2d 96
(La. 1983). Mississippi: Seely v. State, 451 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1984). Missouri: State v. Rider, 664
S.W.2d 617 (Mo. App. 1984);State v. Bailey, 659 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. App. 1983). New Mexico: State
v. Harris, 101 N.M. 12, 677 P.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1984). North Carolina: State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C.
780, 309 S.E.2d 436 (1983). South Dakota: State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7 (S.D. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1422 (1984). Tennessee: State v. Hall, 667 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn. App. 1983). Texas: Simp-
son v. State, 668 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
293. Alabama: Blues v. State, 447 So. 2d 1319 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Pickens v. State, 447 So.
2d 867 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Wabbington v. State, 446 So. 2d 665 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Jack-
son v. State, 440 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). Arizona: State v. McNair, 141 Axiz. 475, 687
P.2d 1230 (1984); State v. Garcia, 141 Ariz. 97, 685 P.2d 734 (1984). Arkansas: Thompson v. State,
280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (Ark. 1983). Colorado: People v. Hernandez, 686 P.2d 1325 (Colo.
1984). Iowa: Lamphere v. State, 348 N.W.2d 212 (Ia. 1984). New Hampshire: State v. Sweeney,
469 A.2d 1362 (N.H. 1983). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Middleton, 467 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super.
1983). Rhode Island: State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702 (R.I. 1984). Wyoming: Engberg v. State,
686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 577 (1984).
294. Only one reversal was obtained in the decisions listed in the two preceeding notes. State v.
Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7 (S.D. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1422 (1984). See supra notes 292 and
293.
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balancing analyses, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach makes rele-
vant almost everything imaginable. The difficulty remains in identifying im-
portant variables, assigning them a weight, and deciding their cumulative
effect. The three-step sequence of objective criteria in Helm is helpful in
determining a framework. 295 Creativity and diligence must be the advo-
cate's watchwords.
Of course, neither counsel nor court should overlook applicable statu-
tory requirements of sentencing regularity. 296 The constitutional analysis
proceeds along familiar lines. Within the statutory maxima, sentencing is
committed to the trial court's discretion. 297 Proportionality analysis is simi-
lar to the analysis the sentencing court must make.298 As an "as applied"
constitutional issue, the analysis is to be conducted on a case-by-case ba-
sis.299 The reviewing court may reach the issue sua sponte.3°° The reviewing
court must be able to apply and articulate the objective factors to save the
sentence from subjectivity.30 1 The burden of persuasion, of course, is on the
defendant to establish the lack of proportionality in the challenged sen-
tence.302 Finally, concerns for waiver and estoppel are sometimes relevant
when, for example, the sentence is the product of detailed plea negotiations
and the record discloses a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea.30 3
First, and foremost, the deciding court must compare the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty. Ascertaining the gravity of the
offense is very problematical. The proper focus is on the blameworthiness of
the defendant rather than on the benefit to society of increased punish-
ment.3°4 Courts should "distinguish between harm to persons and harm to
property, between intentional and negligent conduct, and between harm ac-
tually caused and harm only threatened or risked. '30 5 Of course, the Consti-
tution does not require a "perfect symmetry" and some differences simply
are "not of constitutional dimension. '306 Nevertheless, rough approxima-
tions are quantifiable; "stealing a million dollars is more serious than stealing
a hundred dollars."'307 The most serious punishments must be reserved for
the most serious crimes, crimes against persons involving the taking of life,
the use of force and violence, and the use of weapons. 30 8 Many modern
295. See supra text accompanying note 105. For an insightful and prescient discussion of the
analysis, see generally Dressier, supra note 9, at 1106-12.
296. See generally Perlman & Stebbins, Implementing an Equitable Sentencing System: The Uni-
form Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 65 VA. L. Rlv. 1175 (1979).
297. See United States v. Hollis, 718 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1309
(1984); United States v. DeBright, 710 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1983).
298. See Heatheock v. State, 670 P.2d 1155, 1161 (Alaska 1983) (Singleton, J., concurring and
dissenting).
299. See Weaver v. State, 437 So. 2d 626 (Ala. Crim. App. 1913).
300. Cf United States v. DeBright, 710 F.2d 1404, 1409 n.8 (9th Cir. 1983).
301. Cf Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 n.22 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1600 (1984). Articulation is a constitutional hedge against purely subjective offi-
cial conduct. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
302. See Seritt v. Alabama, 731 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
303. See Taylor v. State, 445 So. 2d 1004 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
304. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1124-28.
305. Id. at 1127.
306. Id.
307. Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 269, 658 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Ark. 1983).
308. See United States v. Greer, 739 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1984); Robertson v. State, 442 So. 2d 162
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crimes, such as sex and drug offenses, do not fit neatly into Year Book pige-
onholes of harm to persons and property. 30 9 Far from insignificant, how-
ever, such crimes may signify a profound blameworthiness. To urge the
once-trendy appellation of "victimless crimes" will not do for proportional-
ity principles. 310 The social interests in such crimes belie that notion. The
qualitative measure of blameworthiness must center on the defendant, but
the blameworthiness of the defendant will be determined, in part, by the
character of the victims, 311 and the degree of harm caused to those vic-
tiMs.312 Relevant data may be gleaned from presentence hearing and psychi-
atric evaluation. 313 Relevant facts include such commonsensical items as
the age, 314 drug addiction, 315 and criminal record316 of the defendant-
everything relevant to the sentencing decision. Indeed, the first factor of
eighth amendment proportionality analysis bears a striking resemblance to
the trial court's sentencing decision in an indeterminate system.317
The severity of the punishment must be considered along a continuum.
The proportionality trilogy described a hierarchy of death penalty, life im-
prisonment and imprisonment for a term of years.318 Of course, the actual
sentence imposed is on review, not the maximum merely authorized in the
statute.319 Theories of punishments such as retribution, general and special
deterrence and rehabilitation are appropriate considerations in proportional-
ity review of severity.320 The punishment must be appropriate to further
such goals. Whether the punishment is discretionary or mandatory is also
relevant. 321 Punishment is two dimensional; besides severity a second dimen-
sion is likelihood. Probability analysis makes relevant the jurisdiction's laws
on parole and clemency; postconviction adjustments may mitigate the sever-
ity of a sentence by reducing the effective term. The difficulty in quantifying
(Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Hubbard v. State, 437 So. 2d 657 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Commonwealth
v. Middleton, 467 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. 1983).
309. Note, supra note 8, at 1128.
310. In response to such an argument, the Supreme Court of South Dakota remarked, "This
argument is so patently inane that it deserves mention for that reason alone." State v. Weiker, 342
N.W.2d 7, 11 (S.D. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1422 (1984).
311. See United States v. Greer, 739 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902
(7th Cir. 1983); State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7 (S.D. 1983).
312. See Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983).
313. See United States v. Hollis, 718 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1309
(1984); State v. Lather, 444 So. 2d 96 (La. 1983).
314. See United States v. Won Chon, 730 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1984).
315. See Simpson v. State, 668 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App. 1984).
316. See Williams v. State, 456 So. 2d 852 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Williams v. State, 441 So. 2d
1157 (Fla. App. 1983). The criminal record of the defendant may not be limited to admissable
evidence. Cf Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949). While the sentence may appear too extreme in the abstract, the court should consider the
historical offense, not just the offense to which a guilty plea was entered. E.g., Cobern v. State, 273
Ala. 547, 142 So. 2d 869 (1962) (death penalty for plea of robbery of automobile in context of brutal
rape and murder). See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 413-14.
317. Gardner, supra note 45, at 1105. See United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.
1984).
318. See supra Part IV.B.
319. See Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 507 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Idaho 1983).
320. See State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7 (S.D. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1422 (1984).
321. See generally Note, Criminal Law: Constitutionality of the Mandatory Minimum Sentence,
18 WASHBURN L.J. 166 (1978).
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the probability that the sentence will be fully served is obvious. 322 In an "as
applied" analysis, it is impossible to decide the proportionality claim without
knowing when offenders are released under the jurisdiction's parole system.
Such uncertainty makes the successful claim all that more difficult. Post-
conviction behavior basically is irrelevant to the proportionality doctrine yet
is often controlling on the release issue. Even when early release is obtained,
substantial limits on liberty remain as does the statistical likelihood of rein-
carceration for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying crime.3 23
It is clear, however, that a sentence imposed without the possibility of pre-
mature release is more severe than one with that possibility.324 It is equally
clear that the likelihood of release is a relevant factor in proportionality anal-
ysis of the severity of the punishment.325 The Rummel opinion emphasized
the high probability of parole in Texas; 326 the Helm opinion emphasized the
low probability of commutation in South Dakota.327 While courts may be
reluctant to "undertake a penological survey" on their own,328 counsel
should obtain the relevant statistics and expert commentary and present
them to the court.329 Federal guidelines, as nation-wide norms, may be
highly relevant in this comparative analysis. Sociological arguments may be
used to establish offense and punishment severity scales which quantify com-
munity perceptions. 330 It is important to emphasize currency. Sentences
imposed and upheld in years past are dim reflections of current societal atti-
tudes. Likewise, it would seem that a sentence is always subject to challenge
if it is arguably based on an erroneous perception of present attitudes.
The second objective factor, comparison with other crimes sentences in
the same jurisdiction, is a relative measure. 331 Considering the fairness and
equality of the defendant's sentence requires context. The legislative context
comes first. The court should consider sentences statutorily authorized
within the jurisdiction and place the defendant's sentence within the jurisdic-
322. See generally Note, supra note 8, 1129-31. There is a conceptual difficulty, as well. Parole,
reduction of sentence, and clemency are acts of executive grace and the defendant has no substantive
constitutional interest in obtaining such relief. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S.
1 (1979). Therefore, to consider such measures in proportionality analysis pivots a constitutional
value on a purely discretionary and unreviewable practice. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 293-
95 (Powell, L, dissenting).
323. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
324. See United States v. Stead, 740 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Lathers, 444 So. 2d 96,
101 (La. 1983).
325. See generally Note, 27 St. Louis U.L.J., supra note 93, at 682 (1983). See State v. Lathers,
444 So. 2d 96 (La. 1983); State v. Williamson, 342 N.W.2d 15 (S.D. 1983).
326. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 279-82.
327. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16.
328. Simpson v. State, 668 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App. I Dist. 1984).
329. Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 585 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982), affd sub nom Solem v. Helm, 103 S.
Ct. 3001 (1983). See also Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3016 (use of statistics); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. at 280-82 (same). Decisions since the triology follow this approach. See United States v.
Ortiz, Slip op. No. 84-1040 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 1984); United States v. Serhant, 740 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.
1984).
330. See generally Dressier, Thompson, & Wasserman, Effect of Legal Education Upon Percep-
tions of Crime Seriousness: A Response to Rummell v. Estelle, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1247 (1982);
Nevares-Muniz, The Eighth Amendment Revisisted: A Model of Weighted Punishments, 75 J. CRim.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 272 (1984); Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative
and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 224 (1974).
331. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1131-32.
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tional continuum of severity. 332 Gradings and groupings of offenses are sig-
nificant, as are traditional substantive criminal law concerns such as
mandatory or discretionary sentences, the felony/misdemeanor distinction,
and habitual offender treatment. Additionally, counsel should not overlook
records of other actual sentencing decisions. Comparisons can be made
through statistics, case reports, and the actual sentencing dispositions of co-
conspirators and co-defendants. 333
The third objective factor, comparison with the same crime sentences in
other jurisdictions, necessarily assumes the penal codes are the most objec-
tive evidence of absolute proportionality. 334 While there is little risk of sub-
jectivity, counsel and court must be sensitive to principles of federalism. Not
all diversity among states is unconstitutional; some differences are entitled
sovereign choices of a state's legislature. 335 The Constitution, as interpreted
through the engine of judicial review, must be above state sovereignty; that
much has been settled for a long time.336 Yet, it would be a mistake to
believe that there was a specific model penal code in our national Jungian
self-conscious. Regional and local differences exist. Our philosophy of pun-
ishment is eclectic; retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation coexist in con-
flict.337 Moreover, idiosyncratic policies often explain the sentencing
structure in a state.338 Counsel and court must be sensitive to particular
legislative intents. "Stealing a horse in Texas may have different conse-
quences and warrant different punishment than stealing a horse [in Flor-
ida]."'339 Beyond such peculiarities, comparative statistics must be presented
to the court. Regional influences and common perspectives may make some
states' statutes naturally more significant in the comparison. 34° Careful and
complete comparative research ought to be reduced to charts and tables to




Admittedly, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts must give due
332. See Seritt v. State, 731 F.2d 728 (1lth Cir. 1984).
333. See United States v. Rosandich, 729 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ely, 719
F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1983); State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 681 P.2d 708 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1930 (1984); Hughes v. State, 443 So. 2d 1382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983). If more serious crimes
are subject to the same penalty, that is some indication that the sentence in issue may be excessive.
State v. Elbert, 480 A.2d 854 (N.H. 1984).
334. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1132-36.
335. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 386 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
336. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816). Justice Holmes once observed:
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of
Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the several States." O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 295-96 (1920).
337. See supra text accompanying note 270.
338. See Note, supra note 75, at 513.
339. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. at 3019 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
340. See Seritt v. Alabama, 731 F.2d 728, 735 (11th Cir. 1984) ("southern states" of Georgia,
Mississippi, Florida, and Tennessee compared to Alabama), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545 (1984).
Given the circuits' federalizing influence, the comparative analysis should give prominence to the
sister states in the circuit.
341. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 269-74 nn.9 & 10, 279.
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deference to the states' evaluations in sentencing and cannot be merely sub-
jective in the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment challenges. Yet,
"neither can [the courts] sanction as being merely unwise, that which the
constitution forbids. ' 342 Under commonly accepted and modem concepts
of penology, the punishment is expected to fit the offender and the crime.
343
The Court's analysis must be conducted accordingly, for the Constitution
contemplates that ultimately the Court's judgment will be brought to bear
on the questioned acceptability of a penalty under the eighth amendment.
Punishments inevitably exist that should be barred by the eighth amendment
and it matters not that they are approved by their authorizers or imposers.
The states are empowered to make sentencing decisions and the
Supreme Court should not ordinarily invade that province. The interests of
the nation are ordinarily best served when the constraints of federalism and
comity are observed. It is therefore without dispute that, absent constitu-
tional implications, the Court must be sensitive to valid state interests, defer-
ring to the judgment of state legislators and state courts.
It is equally uncontroverted, however, that those same states are bound
to obey the mandates of the federal Constitution. Therefore, the Supreme
Court must be able and willing to evaluate their performances. Neither the
enactment by the state legislature nor the ruling of the state sentencing court
alone can determine eighth amendments rights, particularly when state op-
portunities to correct constitutional errors have been exhausted. Even in a
recidivism context, where deference to state severity in sentencing may be
heightened, the sentence is only "largely", and not exclusively, within the
discretion of the state. To refute a check on that discretion would render it
absolute and beyond the Constitution.
The caution with which the Court has historically intervened to find a
punishment cruel and unusual reflects an almost too careful balance between
deference to the principles of comity on the one hand and federalism rights
on the other. When, however, a state act, cannot keep company with the
basic concepts of human dignity or other clear constitutional commands, the
Court's duty, and not its discretion, is invoked.
Since its earliest confrontation with severity of sentencing and propor-
tionality of punishment, the Supreme Court has, as in most criminal due
process contexts, struggled with the concept of federalism. The present
Court will be noted for its great deference to the states and for often prefer-
ring traditional institutional forces over constitutional guarantees. In Rum-
mel, the majority sought to develop elaborate barriers behind which to
retreat. A sophisticated state violation of human dignity was immunized in
the process. In Rummel and in Davis, the majority had great difficulty in
implementing its few broad policy decisions. The abdication soon proved
too much. In Helm, a new majority of those present at the decision of Rum-
mel recognized the inability or unwillingness of some state criminal justice
systems to foster constitutional guarantees. In reaffirming principles of pro-
portionality in sentencing, the Helm majority was in reality reasserting its
342. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 103.
343. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
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role as a part-time Republican conscience-"part-time" because there can be
no absolutism in developing a role for the Supreme Court in the Republic.
Above all else, there must be the threat of constitutional scrutiny.
In the past, the Court's infrequent reliance on the proportionality prin-
ciple resulted from an uncertainty sounding of constitutional dimension. It
may be that hard cases make bad law.344 In proportionality review, at least,
some bad cases have made cruel and unusual law. The trilogy of decisions,
Rummel, Davis, and Helm, are not without their remaining uncertainties.
Still, these decisions have gone far to clarify the law. It is unlikely that there
will be a deluge of proportionality reversals. On the contrary, the principle
must be applied selectively to have continued legitimacy. Most sentences are
invulnerable. Only in the close cases will the reviewing court need to ago-
nize through the three-part analysis. The courts will play their proper role
and the Constitution will be served. In time, the punishment will fit the
crime.345
344. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904).
345. W. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, MIKADO, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND
SULLIVAN 331 (W. Norton ed. 1976) (quoted in Mulligan, supra note 10, at 639 n.3.) ("My object all
sublime / I shall achieve in time / To let the punishment fit the crime--/ The Punishment fit the
crime.")
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